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Residential natural gas customers in the United States face volumetric charges for natural gas that
average about 30% more than marginal cost. The large markup on natural gas – which is used to cover
the fixed infrastructure and operating costs of the local distribution companies – is widely recognized
to be inefficient. Nonetheless, attempts to reduce volumetric charges, and cover the revenue shortfall
through increased fixed monthly fees, have faced opposition based on the belief that current rate schedules
have desirable distributional consequences. We evaluate this claim empirically using nationally-representative
household-level data. We find that natural gas consumption is weakly correlated with household income,
so current rate schedules are only mildly progressive. Under current rate schedules, high-volume customers
pay a disproportionately large share of fixed costs, but these exhibit a weak correlation with high-income
households. The correlation is somewhat weaker still when we consider alternative indicators of household
financial stress, such as poverty status or number of children in the household. We show, for example,
that poor households with multiple children would receive lower bills on average under marginal cost
pricing. We present evidence that one cause of the weak redistributional impact of the current pricing
policy is that the poor tend to live in less energy efficient homes.
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In regulated markets there is a temptation to use price schedules to pursue distributional ob-
jectives. This is often in direct conﬂict with eﬃciency, which requires that prices be set equal to
marginal cost for all customers.1 This tradeoﬀ between equity and eﬃciency is particularly acute
in markets with large ﬁxed costs such as energy, water, transportation and telecommunications.
Residential sales of natural gas exemplify this issue. A large part of the total cost of household
natural gas consumption is the cost of transportationand distribution. Local distributioncompanies
(LDCs) in the United States spend billions annually installing and maintaining the distribution grid
and metering infrastructure, as well as in processing bills, taking customer service calls and other
functions. Many of these costs are ﬁxed with respect to the number of customers served or the
volume they consume. As a result the LDC functions are widely considered to exhibit declining
average costs within a geographic region, a classic natural monopoly. Exactly the same issue comes
up in electricity, water and, until recently, wired phone service.
The challenge in regulating markets with declining average costs is that a single price set equal to
marginal cost does not provide enough revenue to pay for ﬁxed costs. Coase (1946) was among the
ﬁrst to consider the question of what eﬃcient pricing would look like in such markets. His solution
was to use two-part tariﬀs. In the simplest case, the tariﬀ has two components, a volumetric charge
and a ﬁxed monthly fee. The volumetric charge is set equal to marginal cost and the ﬁxed monthly
fee is set equal to each customer’s share of ﬁxed costs.
In practice, natural gas rate schedules in the United States diﬀer substantially from this theo-
retical ideal. Although the norm is indeed to use two-part tariﬀs, typically this takes the form of
low ﬁxed monthly fees and high volumetric charges. We ﬁnd that, on average, volumetric charges
for residential customers are marked up by about 30% above marginal cost. These markups impose
deadweight loss by leading existing natural gas customers to consume too little natural gas, and
imply that high-volume customers pay a larger share of ﬁxed costs than low-volume customers.
A natural approach to address these departures from marginal cost pricing would be to reduce
the markups and increase ﬁxed monthly fees commensurately. Although it is widely understood
that eﬃciency could be improved by moving closer to marginal cost pricing, attempts at rate reform
face substantial political opposition because of a widespread perception that current rate schedules
have desirable distributional consequences. Poor people consume less natural gas, it is argued, so
rebalancing revenue collection towards the ﬁxed monthly fee would disproportionately harm them.
Although this view is widely held by regulators and rate-payer protection groups, we are aware of
1This is true in the absence of other distortions. We discuss second-best issues later in the paper.
1little direct empirical evidence that supports it.
In this paper we use a nationally representative household-level dataset to calculate the dis-
tributional impact of a transition to marginal cost pricing. Our analysis shows that rebalancing
rates would indeed cause low-volume customers to pay more and high-volume customers to pay
less. We also ﬁnd, however, that high-volume and high-income are not synonymous; the correlation
between natural gas consumption and household income is positive, but surprisingly weak. Conse-
quently, current price schedules deliver only a modest amount of redistribution from high-income
to low-income households. For example, we ﬁnd that under marginal cost pricing households in
the lowest (ﬁrst) income quintile would pay an average of $44 more per year for natural gas, while
households in the ﬁfth quintile would pay an average of $58 less. These bill impacts are fairly small
when viewed as a fraction of household natural gas expenditure or as a fraction of total household
income.
Our paper highlights two confounding factors that help explain the weak correlation between
natural gas consumption and household income. First, we document a positive correlation between
household income and energy eﬃciency. Controlling for geographic region, low-income households
tend to have older furnaces, live in poorly insulated homes, and have single-pane windows. This
may be explained, in part, by the fact that low-income households are more likely to be renters
and the principal-agent problem between landlords and tenants leads to underinvestment in energy
eﬃciency. Second, we show that low-income households are more likely to have children in the
home. Households with children are more likely to be home during the day and more likely to
keep their homes at higher temperatures. With more energy eﬃcient homes and fewer children,
high-income households tend to use less natural gas than would be expected due to the income
eﬀect alone.
We evaluate the distributional consequences of rate reform using several diﬀerent measures of
household need, beginning with household income. Household composition is an important factor
in measuring ﬁnancial need, so we also measure redistribution by the ratio of income to the poverty
line for the speciﬁc household’s composition of adults, children and elderly. Using this needs-
adjusted measure of household income we ﬁnd even smaller distributional impacts. In addition,
we focus directly on households with diﬀerent numbers of children, ﬁnding that households with
children would pay less on average under marginal cost pricing, and households with two or more
children would pay substantially less.
We also consider a variety of diﬀerent assumptions about the price elasticity of demand. The
ﬁrst set of results is calculated assuming that customers exhibit zero elasticity to this change in
2prices. Then we expand the analysis to recognize that customers faced withlower volumetriccharges
will consume more natural gas. Incorporating eﬃciency gains into the analysis makes the welfare
impact of a change to marginal cost pricing more positive (or less negative) for all households.
Under the most plausible behavioral responses, we ﬁnd that the average household in the lowest
quintile would see its consumer surplus fall by $21 per year, while the average household in the
highest quintile would gain $69 per year.
Moreover, we assess how the distributional consequences of rate reform would be aﬀected by
energy assistance programs. The largest such existing program, the Low Income Home Energy
Assistance Program (LIHEAP) operates in all 50 states with a $4.5 billion dollar budget in 2009. We
discuss some of the challenges inherent in administering such programs, but also provide evidence
indicating that needs-tested programs can substantially mitigate the negative distributional eﬀects
of a transition to marginal cost pricing. We show that even a relatively modest energy assistance
program ($10 per month) would more than oﬀset the distributional impact of rate reform for most
low-income households.
This paper is related to a rich existing theoretical literature on the eﬃciency and equity of two-
part tariﬀs. Coase (1946)is a response to Hotelling(1938) which argues that all prices in an economy
should be set equal to marginal cost, with ﬁxed costs paid for with government subsidies from
income, inheritance, and property taxes. In cases where it is impractical to pay for ﬁxed costs using
government subsidies, Baumol and Bradford (1970) derive elasticity-based conditions following
Ramsey (1927) to describe how prices should be marked up above marginal cost.2 Feldstein (1972)
incorporates equity into the analysis, showing how by assuming a functional form for the social
welfare function one can derive formulas for the socially optimal two-part tariﬀ. Auerbach and
Pellechio (1978) build on the model described by Feldstein, taking into account that prices aﬀect
the number of customers in a market and that these changes along the extensive margin may be
important for eﬃciency.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes relevant background information about the
structure of the residential natural gas distribution market. Section 3 discusses the data used for the
analysis. Section 4 describes current natural gas rate schedules in the United States and presents
estimates of volumetric charges and ﬁxed monthly fees. Section 5 performs the key counterfactual in
the paper, calculating the changes in bills that would be experienced in a transition to marginal cost
2Baumol and Bradford focus broadly on departures from marginal cost pricing in the economy but point out that
their main results are applicable for two-part tariﬀs in regulated markets. Ng and Weisser (1974) make this application
explicit, deriving conditions that describe the optimal two-part tariﬀ in the presence of a budget constraint when the
number of customers is not ﬁxed. A related literature including Oi (1971) and Schmalensee (1981) examines two-part
tariﬀs in unregulated monopoly markets.
3pricing. Section 6 extends this analysis, incorporating eﬃciency eﬀects and discussing implications
for related markets including the market for greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, Section 7 concludes
by summarizing the key lessons of the analysis.
2 The Natural Gas Distribution Market
The natural gas market in the United States consists of gas producers, interstate pipeline
operators, and local distribution companies (LDCs). Our analysis focuses on LDCs, a segment of
the market for which costs are well understood. The main cost for LDCs is the commodity cost of
natural gas, which is measured by the “city gate price”, the price at which the LDC receives natural
gas at the entrance to its distribution network. Once the gas enters the distribution network, very
small quantities are lost to leakage and used to power the compressors that push the gas through
the system, but these represent a negligible fraction of total costs.3
Natural gas distribution is a large market that directly aﬀects over 60% of U.S. households.
Between 2000 and 2009, total expenditure on natural gas by residential customers averaged $53
billion annually. Of this, $20 billion on average went to costs incurred by LDCs above and beyond
the cost of natural gas itself.4 The large size of the market suggests that both the eﬃciency and
equity implications of rate schedule adjustments could be signiﬁcant. In this section, we brieﬂy
describe the organization of the market, highlighting the features that are relevant for the analysis.5
In addition to commodity costs, LDCs face the ﬁxed and sunk costs of installing and maintaining
the pipeline network, installing and maintaining gas meters, processing bills and taking customer
service calls. These costs are virtually all ﬁxed with respect to the level of consumption of natural
gas. Some of these are “customer-level” ﬁxed costs – which scale approximately with the number
of customers served, such as billing and meter installation/maintenance – while others are “system-
level” ﬁxed costs, which are largely invariant to the number of customers.
Natural gas LDCs are regulated by state utility commissions which set rate schedules for each
customer class. Using traditional rate-of-return techniques, regulators determine rate schedules to
equate total revenues from all customer classes with total costs. A standard result in regulation
3According to U.S. Department of Energy (2008), in 2005 44 billion cubic feet of natural gas was used by LDCs for
pipeline and storage compressors, new pipeline ﬁll, and other uses associated with the operation of the distribution
grid. Another 19 billion cubic feet was lost out of the distribution grid from leaks, damage, and accidents. However,
all of this together represents only 0.5% of the natural gas transported by LDCs. Therefore, the city gate price is a
good approximation of the marginal cost of delivering an additional unit of natural gas. In the empirical analysis we
inﬂate city gate prices by 0.5% to account for these pipeline and storage uses.
4U.S. Department of Energy (2010a).
5For more information about the organization and regulatory history of the U.S. natural gas market see Viscusi,
Hamilton, and Vernon (2005) and U.S. Department of Energy (2010b).
4is that eﬃciency requires that marginal prices be set equal to marginal costs. The availability of
two-part tariﬀs facilitates pricing at marginal cost because the volumetric charge can be set equal
to marginal cost and the ﬁxed monthly fee set to cover ﬁxed costs. In natural gas with declining
average costs and constant marginal costs, this would imply setting the ﬁxed monthly fee equal to
each customer’s share of the LDC’s ﬁxed costs.6
In practice, natural gas rate schedules diﬀer substantially from this theoretical ideal. Typically
the volumetric component includes not only a commodity charge, but also an additional per unit
charge for transportation infrastructure, maintenance, billing and other non-volumetric costs, thus
increasing the retail price per unit well above marginal cost. To better understand rate schedules in
the United States we examined the residential rate schedules for the ﬁfty largest natural gas LDCs.
As of summer 2010, 48 of 50 had some ﬁxed monthly fee in their tariﬀs, generally ranging from $5
to $15 per month, but as high as $26, and two LDCs had no ﬁxed monthly fee. The volumetric
charge for natural gas is constant for 30 of the 50 LDCs, with 13 charging decreasing-block prices
(a higher volumetric charge for the ﬁrst units consumed each month and then a lower volumetric
charge for all additional units) and the remaining 7 charging increasing-block prices. In all 50
cases, the volumetric charge was well above the marginal natural gas acquisition cost of the LDC.
This pattern of low ﬁxed monthly fees and high volumetric charges has been a well-known feature
of natural gas rate schedules in the United States since the emergence of a national natural gas
market in the 1930s.
This combinationof low ﬁxed monthly fees and high volumetriccharges causes LDC net revenues
– net of commodity costs – to be highly seasonal, with LDCs collecting a large share of their total
annual net revenue during cold, high-demand winter months. LDC net revenues are highly volatile
both across months and across years. For example, a warmer than average winter can dramatically
reduce an LDCs annual net revenue. This revenue volatility is a major source of concern among
natural gas LDCs. Simple time-series forecasting of residential consumption a year in advance has
a 95% conﬁdence interval of about plus or minus 20% of sales, so the annual mismatch between
net revenues and the non-commodity costs of the LDC can be quite substantial.7
6Although in theory ﬁxed monthly fees could vary between diﬀerent types of households, most natural gas LDCs
use uniform pricing, in which all households in the utility district face the same price schedule. An important exception
is energy assistance for low-income households, an issue to which we return in Section 5.2. Later in the paper we also
address the extensive margin (in Section 6.2) and the idea that increasing ﬁxed monthly fees can ineﬃciently induce
customers to stop using natural gas altogether.
7To arrive at this ﬁgure, we collected sales data on 1084 natural gas utilities in the U.S. from the EIA-176 Query
System. We then estimated the regression ln(Qt) = α0 + α1ln(Qt−1) + α2t + α3t
2 + ￿ where Qt is residential
consumption for year t. The mean standard error of these regressions was about 0.1 (median about 0.09). Results
are essentially identical using average usage per customer, indicating that this volatility is not driven by changes in
the number of customers.
5Many utilities have adopted a variety of innovative rate designs that “decouple” net revenues
from consumption levels. The simplest and most eﬃcient approach to reducing this volatility would
be to increase the ﬁxed monthly fee and reduce the volumetric charge to more closely reﬂect the
marginal acquisition costs for natural gas. Nonetheless, with few exceptions natural gas utilities
have not gone in that direction. Instead, “decoupling” typically involves mechanisms by which
the volumetric component of the bill is automatically adjusted in response to weather and other
factors.8
Distributional considerations are frequently cited as an explanation for this preference for vol-
umetric charges.9 When LDCs revenues are overwhelmingly derived from the volumetric charge,
high-demand customers are responsible for a larger share of total revenues than they would be if
gas were priced at marginal cost. When the ﬁxed monthly fee is zero, for example, a customer con-
suming 100,000 cubic feet annually pays twice as much as a customer consuming 50,000 cubic feet
despite the fact that the cost of providing distribution service to these customers is nearly the same.
This can have positive distributional consequences to the extent that natural gas consumption is
correlated with household income or other measure of need.
This distributional argument features prominently in rate hearings. For example, the Attorney
General of Arkansas has argued against proposed increases in the ﬁxed monthly fee, “While con-
sumption by individual customers varies, on the average, lower income people use less natural gas
than higher income people.” (Docket 04-121-U) Comparing natural gas consumption with average
household income at the zip code level, this testimony ﬁnds a “mild but statistically signiﬁcant
relationship to income”, and argues that increases in the ﬁxed monthly fee are, “likely to harm low
income people” (Docket 06-161-U).10
Concerns about the distributional implications of rate reform persist even though several state
and federal programs provide energy assistance for low-income households. Nonetheless, how eﬀec-
tively these income-based programs would mitigate the distributional consequences of rate reform
is an empirical question. As we discuss later in the paper, the eﬀectiveness of energy assistance
8For details see American Gas Association, “Decoupling and Natural Gas Utilities: Fact Sheet,” released February
2010. As of 2010, 26 utilities in 13 states have adopted mechanisms that adjust volumetric charges in response to
weather and other factors.
9An alternative explanation for this preference for volumetric charges is oﬀered by Sherman and Visscher (1982)
who argue that rate schedules in electricity and natural gas are a manifestation of the Averch-Johnson eﬀect (Averch
and Johnson, 1962). The argument is that a low ﬁxed monthly fee and high volumetric charge increase the total
number of customers because even customers with a low level of demand for natural gas decide to connect. This
increases the total level of capital expenditures and, if allowed rate of return is above the cost of capital, also proﬁts.
10See also JBS Energy, Inc. “Economic and Demographic Factors Aﬀecting California Residential Energy Use”
September 2002 and NERA Economic Consulting, “Economic and Demographic Factors Aﬀecting Arkansas Residen-
tial Energy Use” April 2007. The 2002 study ﬁnds that lower-income households are more likely to live in multi-unit
buildings, which tend to use less energy for heating than single-family units of the same size.
6programs depends not only on the overall budget allocated for energy assistance, but also on the
particular income-eligibility rules, as well as the take-up rate among eligible populations.
3 Data
3.1 The Residential Energy Consumption Survey
The central dataset used in this analysis is the 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey
(RECS), a nationally-representative in-home survey of households in the United States conducted
every ﬁve years by the Department of Energy.11 The RECS provides detailed information about
the demographic characteristics of the household including household income, number of children,
and the age of all household members. In addition, RECS includes highly-detailed information
about the housing unit itself as well as about the appliances owned by the household.
The 2005 RECS includes 4,382 total households. From the complete sample we exclude house-
holds who do not use natural gas. This eliminates 1,690 households, or 39% of the sample. In
addition, we exclude an additional 137 households who do not directly pay for natural gas. Most
of these households live in rental housing units in large multi-unit buildings where household-level
metering is not available. It makes sense to drop both of these groups of households because nei-
ther would be directly aﬀected by changes in natural gas rate schedules. After these exclusions we
are left with a sample that includes 2,555 households, or about 500 per group when we examine
households by quintile.
An important feature of the RECS is that, in addition to these household and housing char-
acteristics, it provides high-quality information about natural gas consumption and expenditure.
This information is obtained directly from the LDC that provides natural gas to the home. The
data collection proceeds as follows. First, during the in-home survey the household is asked which
company supplies natural gas to the home. If available, the surveyor also makes copies of the
household’s recent bills to make it easier to match households with their billing records. Second,
the staﬀ at RECS follows up with the LDC, requesting the previous 12 months of bills for the
household. Third, the RECS staﬀ use this information to construct an annual measure of natural
gas consumption and expenditure for each household.12 RECS is the only nationally-representative
11Interviews for the 2009 RECS started in February 2010, but microdata will not be available for several years.
12In requesting bill information from the LDCs, the Department of Energy makes it clear that the reported dollar
amounts for expenditures should include all charges including the ﬁxed monthly fee. The survey instrument is also
clear about how households on LIHEAP and other energy-assistance program should be treated. In particular, the
LDCs are clearly instructed not to report the discounted bill, but instead to report the dollar amount of how much
the household would have paid had they been on the regular rate schedule without energy-assistance.
7household-level survey that provides both demographic information and utility-provided energy
billing data.
The measure of income in the RECS is total household income from all sources (employment
income, retirement income, cash beneﬁts from public assistance, and non-cash beneﬁts) before taxes
and deductions. Income is reported in 24 diﬀerent categories ranging from the annual equivalent
of “less than $2,500” to “more than $120,000”. In the analysis that follows we use a continuous
measure of household income constructed using the midpoint of the range.13 For each household
we calculate their Federal income tax liability using TAXSIM Version 9.0.14 We calculated tax
liability for 2005 using household income, marital status, number of children, and the age of the
household head. We then subtracted tax liability from household income to calculate after-tax
annual household income for each household.
3.2 Federal Poverty Thresholds
To gauge the ﬁnancial stress on a household, many researchers have argued that income should
be adjusted for household composition. To do so, we also examine household income as a percentage
of the federal poverty threshold for the speciﬁc household’s demographics. We use the federal
poverty thresholds for 2005 which are based on the total number of household members, the number
of children, and whether or not the household head is age 65 and over.15 Poverty thresholds vary
considerably depending on household composition, ranging from $9,367 for a single individual 65
years and over to $37,757 for a household with eight or more children. We prefer this measure
of needs-adjusted household income to household income per capita because the former measure
takes into account that there are diﬀerences in needs across household members of diﬀerent ages
and that there are economies of scale within the household.16
13For the top category we use $200,000 based on the conditional mean from more detailed household annual income
data for 2005 from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement for
2006. Table HINC-06. “Income Distribution to $250,000 or More for Households: 2005”. Our results are not sensitive
to this assumption, however, because we perform the distributional analysis by quintiles and even after adjusting for
diﬀerences in the composition of households these households in this top income category are always assigned to the
top quintile.
14For more information about TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993). Created and maintained by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, TAXSIM is a tax calculator designed for use with survey data. Based on a database of
hundreds of thousands of actual tax returns, the program has been used in hundreds of studies and has been shown
to calculate Federal income tax liability to a high degree of accuracy.
15U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division, “Poverty Thresholds for 2005 by
Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 19 Years”. Except for somewhat higher poverty thresholds
established for Alaska and Hawaii, neither the poverty thresholds from the U.S. Census Bureau nor similar “poverty
guidelines” from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services distinguish by state. We discuss in Section
3.3 that the RECS data do not identify state of residence for most households, so even if state-level thresholds were
available they would be diﬃcult to incorporate.
16Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, Chapter 8) provides a primer on using equivalence scales for comparing welfare
across households with diﬀerent characteristics.
8Table 1 reports covariate means and standard deviations by needs-adjusted household income
quintile. The ﬁrst quintile, for example, includes households between 0 and 148% of the federal
poverty line. Annual household income increases from an average of $16,500 in the ﬁrst quintile
to $129,800 in the ﬁfth quintile. All dollar values in the paper have been inﬂation-adjusted to
reﬂect year 2010 prices. The large standard deviations for household income reﬂect the fact that
the poverty thresholds vary across households depending on household composition. For example,
households with several children can have a relatively high level of household income yet appear in
one of the bottom quintiles for needs-adjusted household income.
Household economic and demographic characteristics diﬀer substantially across quintiles. The
average number of children decreases from 0.94 in the poorest quintile to 0.52 in the wealthiest
quintile and the proportion of households who own a home increases steadily across quintiles from
0.49 to 0.91. The proportionof households who receive energy assistancedeclines across the quintiles
as one would expect. Whereas 18% and 6% of households in the two lowest quintiles received some
form of energy assistance in 2005, no households in the highest three quintiles received energy
assistance.
Natural gas consumption and expenditure in panel (B) increase across quintiles. Mean annual
expenditure on natural gas increases from $743 to $993, and the fraction of income dedicated to
natural gas expenditures decreases from 6% to less than 1%. In our sample the simple correlation
between natural gas consumption and household income is .19 and the correlation between natural
gas consumption and needs-adjusted household income is .13.
Figure 1 is a scatterplot of natural gas consumption against household income. Each obser-
vation is a household and the ﬁgure includes a ﬁtted least squares regression line.17 The ﬁgure
illustrates that whereas the correlation is positive, little of the variation in natural gas consump-
tion is explained using the variation in household income. Part of this lack of correlation between
natural gas consumption and household income can be explained by systematic diﬀerences in nat-
ural gas consumption across climate zones. However, even within geographic divisions household
income explains only a small fraction of the variation in natural gas consumption. Figure 2 plots
residuals from a regression of natural gas consumption on indicator variables for each of the nine
census divisions against household income. Again the correlation is positive, but weak. Across
census divisions the average R2 from a regression of natural gas consumption on household income
is .09.18 This weak correlation between income and natural gas consumption illustrates the chal-
17For presentation purposes we have excluded from this ﬁgure households whose annual after-tax household income
exceed $120,000 or whose annual natural gas consumption exceeds 250,000 cubic feet. These households are included
in all statistical analyses.
18Ideally it would be preferable to examine the within-utility correlation between natural gas consumption and
9lenge of using natural gas price schedules for redistribution, highlighting the fact that only very
large changes in the price schedule will be have substantial distributional eﬀects, and that any price
reform will impact diﬀerent types of households diﬀerently.
Finally, panel (C) describes three measures of residential energy eﬃciency. The proportion
of households that report having a heating system that is less than 10 years old increases across
quintiles from 34% to 50%. Likewise, the proportion of the houses that are well insulated and
the proportion that have double pane windows both also exhibit a strong positive correlation with
needs-adjusted household income. This positive relationship between energy eﬃciency and needs-
adjusted household income remains after controlling for geographic division. In alternative results
(not reported) we regressed energy eﬃciency on needs-adjusted household income and indicator
variables for each census division. For all three measures of energy eﬃciency the coeﬃcient on
needs-adjusted household income is positive and statistically signiﬁcant with t-statistics ranging
from 5.4 to 9.9.
One potential explanation for this pattern is the landlord-tenant problem. Many studies have
pointed out that landlords may underinvest in energy eﬃciency when their tenants pay the utility
bill.19 Although investments in energy-eﬃciency could, in theory, be passed on in the form of higher
rents, it may be diﬃcult for landlords to credibly convey information about energy eﬃciency.
In the higher quintiles, households are considerably more likely to be homeowners, and so the
landlord-tenant problem is less important. When we restrict the sample to exclude renters the
correlation between energy eﬃciency and needs-adjusted household income is positive but weaker.
In additional alternative results (also not reported) we used this smaller sample to perform the
same regressions as before. For all three measures of energy eﬃciency the coeﬃcient on needs-
adjusted household income is again positive and statistically signiﬁcant. However, the magnitude
of the coeﬃcient estimates is 23.8%, 25.2% and 15.1% smaller in magnitude, respectively, consistent
with the landlord-tenant problem providing some but not all of the explanation for the observed
correlation. Other potential explanations include capital constraints, a negative correlation between
income and discount rates (see, e.g. Hausman, 1979 and Dubin and McFadden, 1984), or the idea
that the comfort provided by energy eﬃciency is a normal good.
income. Although this is not possible with the RECS data, in additional results described in Appendix A we have
used an alternative dataset to examine the within-utility correlation for California utilities. Across the three major
natural gas LDCs in California the average R
2 from a regression of natural gas consumption on household income is
.04.
19For a recent investigation of this relationship, see Davis (forthcoming).
103.3 Wholesale Natural Gas Prices
In order to be able to evaluate the impact of price reform, we augment the household-level data
from RECS with natural gas city gate prices from the Platts’ GASdat database. Our measure of
wholesale prices is the “city gate” price, the price paid by LDCs at the entrance to the distribution
network. The Platts data describe daily natural gas spot prices from 131 locations throughout
the continental United States, obtained by Platts via surveys of trades made at each location.
We aggregate daily city gate prices to the monthly level and then calculate state averages across
all locations in a given state. For states without Platts survey locations, prices from the closest
available location are used.
Next we aggregate these data to the annual level by taking consumption-weighted averages over
the year. Total residential consumption by state and month comes from the U.S. Department of
Energy (2010a). The Department of Energy constructs these data using a monthly survey (EIA
Form-857) of natural gas distribution companies. This accounts for the fact that city gate prices
tend to be somewhat higher during winter months when consumption is higher, though seasonal
variation in natural gas prices is mitigated by the ability of natural gas suppliers to store natural
gas.20
For the main analysis we use city gate prices for the period 2003 to 2005. Although LDCs
procure natural gas both on the spot market and in forward markets, LDCs always have the option
to buy or sell natural gas on the spot market. Consequently, the city gate price in a given year
is a good measure of the true marginal cost of natural gas in that year.21 The RECS data report
residential consumption for 12-month periods ending at diﬀerent times during 2005, so the relevant
wholesale prices would be from 2004 and 2005 if residential tariﬀs adjusted immediately to wholesale
price changes. To account for the fact that there is frequently a lag in adjustment, we include 2003
prices as well. Results are qualitatively similar when we use only 2005 data, though they diﬀer
somewhat because there was an unusually sharp increase in natural gas prices during that year.
Many utilities do not have mechanisms that allow them to immediately pass on price increases to
consumers, so LDC net revenue for 2005 was substantially below average. Using average city gate
prices for the period 2003 to 2005 provides a more reasonable representation of typical LDC net
revenues.
The RECS identiﬁes the census division of residence for all households. In addition, the RECS
identiﬁes the state of residence for households living in Texas, California, New York, and Florida.
20U.S. Department of Energy (2010b), Table 14 reports that as of December 2008 working natural gas storage in
the lower 48 states is 4.2 trillion cubic feet, enough to meet total consumption for about two months.
21See Borenstein, Busse, and Kellogg (2009) for a detailed description of natural gas procurement.
11We assign wholesale prices to households using the most highly-disaggregated geographic unit
available, separating households in Texas, California, and New York from their respective census
divisions. Because there are few households in Florida with natural gas connections, we do not
attempt to separate these households from their census division (South Atlantic). Also, we drop the
Paciﬁc census division (Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington) because Platts city gate prices are
not available for Alaska and Hawaii and because even if some city gate price could be constructed
for these states this census division is extremely heterogeneous with regard to proximity to natural
gas producers, weather, and other factors. Thus, the resulting set of geographic units includes
eight census divisions and three individual states.22 For brevity, in the rest of the paper, these
geographic units are referred to simply as divisions. In calculating city gate prices by division, we
use consumption weights across states.
We focus on city gate prices, because those represent most accurately the true marginal cost
of the LDC acquiring additional supplies. Most LDCs purchase some natural gas on short-term
ﬁxed-price, ﬁxed-quantity contracts 30-120 days in advance. Some LDCs also purchase on longer-
term contracts. Because these contracts are for ﬁxed quantities at ﬁxed prices, and because there
are active daily spot markets, the contracts do not change the LDC’s marginal opportunity cost of
providing additional natural gas. They do, however, create capital gains and losses that the LDC
must recover through its rates.
4 Current Natural Gas Rate Schedules
4.1 Graphical Evidence
In this section we use household-level natural gas consumption and expenditure to describe
the natural gas rate schedules faced by residential customers in the United States. Figure 3 plots
annual consumption and expenditure by division. Each observation is a household and the ﬁgures
include a ﬁtted least squares regression line (the dashed grey line).23 Within divisions there is
large variation across households in annual natural gas consumption. As expected, the ﬁgures
22Thus, in addition to the three individual states (California, New York, and Texas), our modiﬁed divisions include
New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island), Middle Atlantic (New Jersey
and Pennsylvania), East North Central (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin), West North Central (Iowa,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota), South Atlantic (Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia), East South
Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee), West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana and Oklahoma),
and Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming).
23For presentation purposes in these ﬁgures we dropped households with annual consumption above 250,000 cubic
feet or annual expenditure above $2,500. These outliers represent less than 2% of the total sample. All subsequent
analyses in the paper includes these observations. We have also tested the sensitivity of our results to excluding these
outliers and the results are essentially identical.
12demonstrate a strong positive correlation between consumption and expenditure. In fact, in most
divisions there are a group of households (and in some cases, more than one group) for whom the
relationship is almost exactly linear. This is consistent with these observations all coming from the
same utility and linear rate schedule.
There is also, however, a large degree of heterogeneity in expenditure in all divisions. In many
cases diﬀerent households consuming the exact same amount of natural gas in the same division pay
considerably diﬀerent amounts. This heterogeneity in rate schedules is at ﬁrst surprising. After all,
natural gas can be easily transported so wholesale prices do not vary much within division. Instead,
these diﬀerences are driven by diﬀerences in the cost of local distribution and other costs that are
recovered in the LDC’s volumetric charge. Within each division there are several diﬀerent LDCs
and costs vary across LDC based on the mix of residential, commercial, and industrial customers,
average consumption levels, population density, age of the distribution grid, and other factors.24 In
addition, the heterogeneity in rate schedules reﬂects the fact that households diﬀer in the timing of
their consumption. Many utilities charge rates that vary seasonally so a household that consumes
proportionately more during winter months pays more on average per unit. A limitation of the
RECS data is that they do not provide monthly consumption, making it impossible to distinguish
these seasonal diﬀerences in consumption from diﬀerences in price schedules across households.
Another factor that creates diﬀerences in rate schedules within divisions is retail choice. Several
states including Georgia, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have active retail
choice programs for residential natural gas customers. In these states customers have a choice
between buying natural gas from their LDC and buying natural gas from independent natural gas
marketers who set their own rate schedules. If the customer buys from an independent marketer,
the LDC provides and is reimbursed for transportation services – for the most part on a volumetric
basis – but marketers set the rate schedules, procure natural gas in the wholesale market, and bill
customers directly.25 Despite the fact that most of the LDC’s costs of providing the services to
retail choice customers do not vary with volume, most of the LDC’s revenues from these customers
are collected on a volumetric basis.
In the calculations that follow we compare households actual expenditure on natural gas with
how much they would have spent under marginal cost pricing. Because rate schedules vary within
division, however, and because we do not observe the exact rate schedules that each household faces,
24LDCs also diﬀer in the longer term natural gas contracts that they sign and the gains and losses these contracts
yield relative to the city gate prices. Those gains and losses are part of why rates diﬀer across LDCs in the same
division.
25In December 2005, 3.9 out of 62.5 million residential natural gas customers in the United States purchased natural
gas from a marketer rather than their LDC. See U.S. Department of Energy (2005) for details.
13our counterfactual also implicitly imposes a uniform retail tariﬀ for all customers within a division.
Under these counterfactual tariﬀs, all customers within a division pay the same ﬁxed monthly fee
and the same volumetric charge. An alternative approach is to perform this harmonization for
both the current tariﬀs and the counterfactual tariﬀs. This is done by using the ﬁtted values from
equation (1) below to predict each household’s expenditure under the average rate schedule for that
division. These predictions can then be compared to expenditure under the marginal-cost-based
alternative tariﬀ. We prefer the former approach because it does not require any assumptions about
the structure of current rate schedules. Nonetheless, it is reassuring that when we instead use this
alternative approach results are quite similar.
Moreover, results are also similar when we repeat the analysis with a completely diﬀerent
dataset, the Residential Appliance Saturation Survey (RASS). A household-level survey conducted
in 2003 by the California Energy Commission, the RASS identiﬁes the exact utility that serves each
household, allowing us to perform the counterfactual bill analysis separately by utility. As described
in detail in Appendix A, the general pattern of results is very similar with these alternative data.
Together with the results from the alternative “harmonization for both actual and counterfactual”
approach above, this analysis suggests that our results are not driven by that fact that we create
the counterfactual at the geographic division, rather than utility, level. In retrospect this is not
surprising because there is no reason ex ante for there to be substantial correlation between within-
division departures from average rate schedules and our measures of household well-being.
4.2 Volumetric Charges
Table 2 describes natural gas rate schedules by region. For clarity, we present results for the four
geographic census regions in the continental United States (North, Midwest, South, and West) that
aggregate the areas reported in the RECS data.26 Columns (1) and (2) describe average features
of natural gas rate schedules. These estimates are derived from the following regression,
Expenditureij = α0j + α1jConsumptionij + ￿ij, (1)
where Expenditureij is annual expenditure for household i in division j, Consumptionij is annual
natural gas consumption, and ￿ij is an error term which captures unmodeled diﬀerences in the rate
26West includes California and the Mountain division; South includes Texas and the West South Central, East
South Central, and South Atlantic divisions; North includes the West North Central and East North Central divisions;
Northeast includes New York and the Middle Atlantic and New England divisions.
14structure across households. We estimate equation (1) separately for the 11 diﬀerent divisions.27
The parameters in this regression have a direct economic interpretation. The intercept, α0j, is
the mean amount paid annually in ﬁxed monthly fees, or equivalently, the level of expenditure
implied by the regression equation for a household that consumes zero. The slope, α1j is the mean
volumetric charge for natural gas.
Table 2 reports average parameter estimates (weighted by households) for North, Midwest,
South, and West regions. Column (1) reports the average estimate of α1j, the volumetric charge
and column (2) report the average estimate of α0j, the ﬁxed monthly fee. Column (3) reports
the wholesale price of natural gas. Wholesale prices were somewhat higher on average in the
Northeast and somewhat lower in the West during this period. These diﬀerences reﬂect diﬀerences
in transportation costs across regions. Most natural gas in the United States is produced in gas
ﬁelds concentrated in the South Central United States and wholesale prices tend to increase as one
moves farther away from these producing areas. On average across all regions households faced
a volumetric charge of $11.34 compared to a city gate price of $8.63 for an average markup of
32.1%. Markups vary somewhat across regions but in all regions the volumetric charge is marked
up considerably above marginal cost.
Our approach uses within-division, across-household variation to infer the average rate schedule
in each geographic division. An alternative to this regression-based approach would be to match
households with their exact rate schedules. With the RECS this is not feasible, however, because
RECS does not identify exactly where households live or from which utility they obtain natural gas.
Given this indirect method for inferring average rate schedules, it is important to cross-check our
estimates with measures of rate schedules from other sources. Davis and Muehlegger (forthcoming)
use aggregate data and a diﬀerent empirical approach to estimate residential natural gas schedules
in the United States during the period 2002-2007. They ﬁnd an average markup of $3.38 per
thousand cubic feet compared to our average markup of $2.71. Although we continue to recognize
that our estimates are only an approximation, it is reassuring that this important feature of the
rate schedules is similar to this existing estimate in the literature.28
27We have also tried a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation that allows α0 and α1 to vary both across division and across
(i) urban, (ii) suburban, (iii) town, and (iv) rural locations. Although utilities typically do not use diﬀerent rate
schedules for these diﬀerent groups, such a speciﬁcation would make sense to the extent that diﬀerent utilities in each
census division tend to serve predominantly households in one particular group. The results with this more ﬂexible
speciﬁcation are essentially unchanged and for parsimony we prefer the baseline speciﬁcation.
28In related work, Naughton (1986) evaluates the eﬃciency and equity of electricity price schedules for a sample
of U.S. electric utilities in 1980. Estimating costs using a translog function, he ﬁnds that per-unit prices exceed
marginal cost by approximately 50% for residential, commercial, and industrial customers. The study then examines
the equity of electricity prices across customer classes, ﬁnding no evidence of cross-subsidization.
154.3 Fixed Monthly Fees
The other key feature of natural gas rate schedules is the ﬁxed monthly fee. Column (2) of
Table 2 reports the average ﬁxed monthly fee, α0j. We estimate that, under current rate schedules,
households in the United States face an average ﬁxed monthly fee of $6.20. The estimates vary
somewhat across regions from $4.22 in the South to $10.90 in the Midwest. Under the assumption
of zero demand elasticity and revenue neutrality, column (4) shows how the ﬁxed monthly fee
would increase if the volumetric charge were set equal to marginal cost. The ﬁxed monthly fee
would need to increase substantially to oﬀset the decrease in revenue that would be caused from
setting the volumetric charge equal to marginal cost. Across regions, the increase in the ﬁxed
monthly fee ranges from $17.92 to $24.20. These ﬁxed monthly fees assure that total LDC revenue
from residential customers would not change under the counterfactual. This assumes no change in
any cross-subsidization across customer classes (residential, commercial, and industrial) or across
energy products for utilities that sell both electricity and natural gas.29
The transition to marginal cost pricing is illustrated graphically in Figure 3. The black line
in these ﬁgures is the marginal cost price schedule. The slope of the line is the estimated mean
city gate price for each division and the vertical intercept is the mean ﬁxed monthly fee under
marginal cost pricing. Notice that the line is considerably ﬂatter than current rate schedules. With
the marginal cost schedule, the LDC pays all operating and capital expenses using revenue from
the ﬁxed monthly fee. Comparing each observation to the marginal cost schedule illustrates how
total expenditure would change under marginal cost pricing. Households with low levels of annual
consumption would tend to pay more, and households with high levels of annual consumption would
tend to pay less. With our sample, 46% of households would pay less under marginal cost pricing
and 54% would pay more. In the following section we examine these distributional consequences in
detail, comparing the characteristics of households with diﬀerent levels of natural gas consumption
and determining how particular types of households would fare under a change to marginal cost
pricing.
29In related research, Knittel (2003) compares prices of single- and dual-product electricity and natural gas utilities,
ﬁnding evidence that the price markups of residential and commercial electricity consumers are used to subsidize
industrial natural gas consumers.
165 A Transition to Marginal Cost Pricing
5.1 Counterfactual Bills
Table 3 describes the distributional impact of a change to marginal cost pricing and the associ-
ated increase in the ﬁxed monthly fee, assuming zero demand elasticity. Panel (A) reports results
by household income quintile. Households in the ﬁrst quintile would pay on average $44 more
annually under marginal cost pricing and 67% of the households in this quintile would experience
some increase in their annual bill. This reﬂects the fact that these households consume less natural
gas than households in other quintiles so the savings experienced from the lower volumetric charge
is too small to oﬀset the increased ﬁxed monthly fee. Households in the fourth and ﬁfth income
quintiles would pay less under marginal cost pricing because they have relatively high consump-
tion levels and thus beneﬁt more from the decrease in the volumetric charge. A majority of the
households in the top two quintiles would experience a decline in expenditures on natural gas.
Results in panel (B) by needs-adjusted household income quintile are similar but somewhat
attenuated compared to the results in the ﬁrst panel. Households in the ﬁrst quintile would pay
on average $30 more annually under marginal cost pricing, whereas households in the ﬁfth quintile
would pay on average $55 less. The smaller dollar changes for the ﬁrst quintile reﬂect the fact that
the needs-adjusted measure accounts for diﬀerences in household composition and is less correlated
with natural gas consumption than household income. In particular, households with children have
higher poverty thresholds and also tend to consume more natural gas.
Households with children are examined speciﬁcally in panel (C). On average, households with
children would experience decreases in natural gas expenditure under marginal cost pricing. The
eﬀect is greater for large households; customers with two or more children would pay on average $34
less annually on natural gas. Panel (D) focuses only on low-income households with children, where
low-income is deﬁned as households in the lowest quintile by needs-adjusted household income.
On average, these households would experience essentially no change in bills under marginal cost
pricing. Low-income households with only one child would see their bills increase on average while
larger low-income households with two or more children would see their bills decline on average.
To put these results into perspective, Table 4 reports natural gas expenditure as a share of
household income. Columns (1) and (2) report expenditure shares under current price schedules
and marginal cost pricing, respectively, and column (3) reports p-values from tests that the means
are equal in columns (1) and (2). In panel (A), natural gas expenditure as a share of income
decreases from about seven percent for the lowest income quintile to less than one percent for
17the highest quintile. Under marginal cost pricing low-income households would pay more and
higher income households would pay less. These diﬀerences, however, are incremental compared
to the existing diﬀerences across quintiles. Panel (B) shows expenditure shares by needs-adjusted
household income quintile. Compared to the upper panel, households in the ﬁrst quintile have
somewhat higher average household income levels, but also somewhat higher average natural gas
consumption levels. These two eﬀects are roughly oﬀsetting so that natural gas expenditure as a
share of income is similar across quintiles to the shares in the ﬁrst panel. A transition to marginal
cost pricing causes shares to change in the same direction and with roughly the same magnitude
as in the ﬁrst panel.
Of course, it has been widely recognized that household income may not be a very good in-
dicator of the sorts of vulnerable populations or ﬁnancial need that are of more direct interest
to policy makers, who are likely more concerned with ﬁnancial stress on the family, permanent
income, or total wealth. See, e.g., Poterba (1989), Poterba (1991) and Cutler and Katz (1992).
Ideally, we would like to compare the results in Tables 3 and 4 to alternative results constructed
using a measure of permanent income or household wealth. Although the RECS data does not
provide multiple years of household income or any measure of ﬁnancial wealth, it does include
highly-detailed information about the appliances owned by the household. In Appendix B we ex-
plain how we used this information together with twenty years of articles from Consumer Reports
magazine to construct a measure of “appliance wealth” for each household based on the number,
age, characteristics, and original cost of the major appliances used by the household. As we discuss
in the appendix, this approach is not a panacea and there are important limitations to “appliance
wealth” as a more long-run measure of household well-being. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd it reassuring
that with this alternative measure we ﬁnd results that are generally similar to the results above.
5.2 Energy Assistance Programs
The estimated bill impacts in Section 5.1 are consistent with conventional wisdom about two-
part tariﬀs, indicating that marginal cost pricing would tend to increase bills on average for low-
income households while decreasing bills on average for high-income households. These estimated
impacts assume that no energy assistance is available for low-income households. In practice,
means-tested energy assistance programs are widely available. LIHEAP, for example, distributes
funds to all ﬁfty states. Many states and local governments oﬀer additional energy assistance, and
at least a few LDCs oﬀer alternative rate schedules to low-income households. It is important
to consider how these programs could mitigate the distributional impact of a change to marginal
18cost pricing. Suppose, for example, that marginal cost pricing was implemented simultaneously
with increased funding for an energy assistance program. This funding could come from public
programs like LIHEAP or could be funded with a surcharge on natural gas customers with income
(or needs-adjusted income) levels above a particular level.
Table 5 reports the baseline results along with results from ﬁve diﬀerent alternative scenarios.
For each scenario the table reports the impact of a change to marginal cost pricing on households in
the ﬁrst quintile by needs-adjusted household income (approximately 150% of poverty line). Row
(1) reports that, with no energy assistance whatsoever, households in the ﬁrst quintile experience
about a $30 annual increase in natural gas bills. This corresponds exactly to the ﬁrst quintile
results in Table 3, panel (B). Row (2) incorporates an energy assistance program that waives the
ﬁxed monthly fee for all households below 150% of the poverty line. The advantage of this lump
sum approach is that it leaves the volumetric charge equal to marginal cost for households receiving
assistance. Under this scenario, the mean impact for the quintile becomes large and negative, a
$210 average annual bill decrease for households below 150% of the poverty. If the program were
internally funded, the other 80% of households would experience annual bill increases of $60 in order
to pay for the program. Row (3) shows that under a less generous program the mean impact for
households below 150% of the poverty line is still negative. In this scenario, the 20% of households
that are below 150% of the poverty line receive a $10 per month lump sum transfer. A program of
this size could be self-ﬁnanced by increasing the ﬁxed monthly fee for the other 80% of households
by $30 annually.
These results suggest that it may be possible for energy assistance programs to substantially
oﬀset the distributional impacts of marginal cost pricing for low-income households. Still, it is
important to point out that energy assistance programs have limitations. For example, it has been
shown to be diﬃcult to identify and enroll eligible households. Casual evidence of this comes from
Table 1 which reports for each quintile the percentage of households who report having received
energy assistance in the previous year. Even though most households in the ﬁrst quintile would
typicallybe eligiblefor LIHEAP or state-level energy assistance programs, only 18% report receiving
energy assistance in the previous year. This is a self-reported measure and one might be concerned
that stigma or some other factor might lead this measure to underestimate true participation levels.
Still, it seems clear that not all eligible households participate in energy assistance programs, and
non-eligible households may attempt to participate fraudulently. Eﬀective screening of program
applicants is expensive and imperfect.30 Rows (4) and (5) in Table 5 examine how incomplete
30Borenstein (2010) discusses this problem in administering means-tested low-income electricity rates for three
California electric utilities.
19takeup aﬀects mean annual bill impacts for the ﬁrst quintile. With 50% takeup, households below
150% of the poverty line experience on average a $30 decrease in bills. With 20% takeup the lump
sum payments are similar in size to bill increases so the net impact is positive but small. The
annual cost per non-recipient is lower for these programs because of the lower participation rate.
It is also worth highlighting that these mean impacts for the ﬁrst quintile obscure substantial
heterogeneity across households. Because households diﬀer substantially in their level of natural
gas consumption, the $10 monthly lump sum transfer is not enough to ensure net bill decreases
for all households in this group. Most at risk of bill increases are households that consume very
low levels of natural gas. Increasing the ﬁxed monthly fee makes these households considerably
worse oﬀ, because they enjoy relatively little beneﬁt from the decreased volumetric charge. More
generous energy assistance could prevent bill increases for these households. For example, one could
waive the entire ﬁxed monthly fee for households below 150% of the poverty line as in row (2).
The tension here is that there are real economic costs of maintaining natural gas connections and
eliminating the ﬁxed monthly fee entirely for these households would induce an ineﬃciently large
number of these households to consume natural gas.
Finally, row (6) considers the impact of an energy assistance program based on an important
characteristic, not of the household but of the housing unit itself. In particular, this row examines a
policy that would provide a $10 lump sum transfer to households living in multi-unit buildings. In
our sample 45% of households below 150% of the poverty line live in multi-unit buildings, compared
to 28% of households overall. Consequently, the policy is reasonably eﬀective at targeting low-
income households and the program has about the same mean impact as a conventional program
with 50% takeup. This type of program is expensive because a large number of households above
150% of the poverty line receive the credit. In addition, one would expect multi-unit discounts to
be at least partially capitalized into rents, meaning that some of the transfer would be received by
landlords rather than tenants. Nonetheless, such a program would also oﬀer a number of potential
advantages. First, whereas traditional programs suﬀer from low enrollment, households in multi-
unit buildings could be automatically enrolled. Second, screening for the multi-unit discount is
low-cost and highly-accurate, making it very diﬃcult for non-eligible households to participate
fraudulently.
Energy assistance programs based on multi-unit discounts would be most eﬀective in utility
districts where housing type is highly correlated with income. In high-density utility districts where
all households live in multi-unit buildings or in low-density utility districts where no households
live in multi-unit buildings there is little scope for redistribution. Alternatively, discounts could
20be based on a richer set of housing characteristics such as square footage or number of rooms, or
even on neighborhood characteristics such as mean household income by zip code. There is little
precedent for natural gas LDCs using this kind of diﬀerentiation and these policies would likely
face political challenges, but these more ﬂexible approaches would also allow better targeting of
needy households.
6 Eﬃciency Eﬀects of Changing Retail Prices
While the distributional impact of changing marginal retail prices of natural gas to reﬂect
marginal cost appears to be fairly modest, the direction of the impact is still contrary to the
general goal of helping lower income households. The argument in favor of such a change rests
on improving economic eﬃciency, which requires that consumers change their behavior in response
to the price changes. The eﬃciency impact, however, is complex, for two distinct reasons. First,
because natural gas is priced in a two-part tariﬀ and the ﬁxed monthly fee would have to be
adjusted as well as the volumetric charge, the change has the potential to cause some consumers
to make non-marginal adjustments: some current consumers of natural gas may decide to exit the
market and some who have not previously been in the market might choose to enter. Second, the
current distortions in the residential market for natural gas are part of a larger set of distortions in
energy pricing. Therefore, a broader analysis of the welfare impact is relevant, one that accounts
for distortions in closely related markets, such as for other energy products.
In the simplest setting, we could focus only on the deadweight loss from non-marginal-cost
pricing of marginal gas consumption, which is a straightforward exercise for any given assumed
demand elasticity. We begin with this calculationand then expand the analysis to consider potential
welfare changes from changes at the extensive margin: customers entering and leaving the natural
gas market. We are not able to make credible point estimates of these impacts, but we attempt to
infer the potential magnitude of these eﬀects. We then discuss further impacts of the natural gas
tariﬀ change due to the fact that related products are not priced eﬃciently. We ﬁrst consider other
energy sources. We then consider one of the most pressing distortions in energy, the failure to price
greenhouse gases. In the analysis thus far, we have assumed that emission of greenhouse gases is
not socially costly and is not priced. We consider two alternative scenarios, one in which carbon
dioxide emissions are socially costly, but still not priced and one in which carbon dioxide emissions
are socially costly and emitters must pay a price that reﬂects that cost. Finally, we consider recent
research that suggests consumers may not carry out the somewhat sophisticated optimization that
21would lead them to respond to marginal price. Instead, consumers might focus on total bill in
relation to consumption, that is, average price. If consumers engage in this sort of sub-optimizing
behavior, we show that the eﬃciency analysis changes substantially.
6.1 Eﬃciency Eﬀects of Marginal Quantity Changes
The counterfactuals we have considered thus far show how household expenditure on natural
gas would change under marginal cost pricing if demand elasticity were zero, which implies no
eﬃciency consequences of the change. With non-zero elasticity, volumetric charges above marginal
cost impose deadweight loss, as customers consume too little natural gas. We ﬁrst address this
issue under the assumption that the tariﬀ change doesn’t cause any consumers to enter or exit the
market.
Table 6 reports estimates by needs-adjusted household income quintile of the average annual
change in consumer surplus resulting from a switch to marginal cost pricing. The table reports
consumer surplus change estimates under a range of diﬀerent plausible price elasticities of demand,
ranging from 0.0 to -0.6.31 The relevant elasticity for these calculations is the long-run demand
elasticity for which empirical estimates in the literature are rare and not very convincing.32 Rather
than take a strong stand on the magnitude, we report estimates for this relatively broad range.
To calculate the consumer surplus gain for each household, we assume a constant elasticity form
of demand, D(p) = Aip￿ where all households have identical demand up to a scale parameter Ai.
On average in our sample lowering the volumetric charge to equal marginal cost implies a 32%
decrease. With a -0.2 price elasticity, for example, this yields an average increase in natural gas
consumption of 3.5 units (thousand cubic feet) annually compared to a baseline level of 68.7 units.
We calculate the change in consumer surplus as the area to the left of the demand curve from the
original volumetric charge to the price that reﬂects marginal cost, and then we subtract oﬀ the
diﬀerence between the ﬁxed monthly fees shown in Table 3.33
The magnitude of the eﬃciency impact varies predictably with the assumed elasticity, with
31As a point of comparison, the U.S. Department of Energy (2003) adopts for natural gas a -0.41 long-run price
elasticity of demand for residential customers.
32Long-run elasticities are diﬃcult to estimate credibly because it may take several years for agents to fully respond
to price changes. For example, in the long run, consumers may respond to a decrease in natural gas prices by
purchasing a less-eﬃcient furnace than they would have otherwise. Because the stock of equipment turns over slowly,
the full long-run impact of a price change may not be realized for many years and estimating such long-run eﬀects
using historical data is extremely challenging.
33We ignore income eﬀects and calculate surplus changes along the constant-elasticity Marshallian demand curve.
The wealth change for the vast majority of households is an extremely small share of annual income as shown in
Table 4. Combined with the fact that the income elasticity of demand for natural gas is generally estimated to be
well below one, this implies that the cost of omitting income eﬀects is not material.
22larger increases in consumer surplus for larger elasticities. The ﬁrst column reports estimates for
￿ = 0. These results correspond exactly to the results in panel (B) of Table 3 which assumed zero
elasticity. For a price elasticity of -0.2, households are better oﬀ across quintiles by on average
about $5 per year. Consumer surplus continues to increase with larger price elasticities. Changing
the assumed elasticity from zero to -0.6 raises the average consumer surplus of customers in the
population by about $16 per year.
These estimates assume that the price elasticity is the same across income classes. Natural gas
expenditure represents a smaller share of total household expenditure for higher income households,
so one might expect the price elasticity to be smaller for these households. Although we are not
aware of any direct evidence from the natural gas market, this is consistent with evidence from
Reiss and White (2005) and Ito (2010) who ﬁnd that the price elasticity of demand for electricity
is smaller for high income households.34 Redoing the exercise with heterogeneous price elasticities
would increase the welfare gains for households in the lower quintiles and decrease the welfare gains
for households in the upper quintiles, but would not change the qualitative pattern. In particular,
even with a considerably larger price elasticity for low-income households the eﬃciency gains would
still be too small to oﬀset the direct bill impact.
Because these calculations hold the LDC’s proﬁts constant, by construction, the sum of the
changes in consumer surplus reﬂects the entire welfare change. Table 6 also reports the overall
average change in consumer surplus across all households in the dataset. Multiplying this number
by the 65 million households35 that consume natural gas in the United States implies that the total
ineﬃciency from non-marginal-cost pricing of natural gas to residential customers is $314 million
per year with an elasticity of -0.2 and $989 million per year with an elasticity of -0.6.
Using a diﬀerent dataset and empirical methodology, Davis and Muehlegger (forthcoming) ﬁnd
that with a -0.2 elasticity the annual deadweight loss borne by residential natural gas customers
between 2001 and 2007 from non-marginal cost pricing was $968 million. Our considerably lower
estimate($314 million) reﬂects the fact that in 2005 natural gas prices were unusually high and retail
prices did not fully adjust to reﬂect this increased commodity cost, resulting in a lower markup.
Moreover, because the level of prices was much higher in 2005, we estimate a considerably lower
percentage markup which (with a constant elasticity demand function) implies a smaller change in
34Ito (2010), for example, ﬁnds a (short-run) price elasticity of -0.13 for households with household income below the
median, compared to -0.09 for households with household income above, a diﬀerence which is statistically signiﬁcant
but small in magnitude.
35The RECS sampling weights imply that in 2005 there were 65.1 million households in the United States with
natural gas connections. As a point of comparison, U.S. Department of Energy (2010a) reports 63.6 million residential
customers in 2005 using aggregate data reported by utilities.
23quantity consumed.
These results help clarify the overall tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and redistribution. For the
long run elasticity of -0.4, the eﬃciency cost of non-marginal-cost pricing is $644 million per year
and the redistribution impact is to transfer about $520 million per year to households in the two
lowest needs-adjusted household income quintiles. Thus, for this price elasticity of demand the
deadweight loss from transferring these funds is estimated to be more than 100% of the transfer.
This is higher than the cost of public funds ratios generally referenced for tax-funded expenditures,
which are generally less than 50%.36
This apparently strong case against non-marginal-cost pricing of natural gas, however, seems
less strong when we consider other potential distortions in the following subsections.
6.2 Eﬃciency Eﬀects of Changes on the Extensive Margin
Balancing the revenue lost from lower volumetric charges by raising ﬁxed monthly fees will
also have an eﬃciency eﬀect. Theoretically, it could have two types of eﬃciency eﬀects: current
customers might leave the market (“leavers”) and current non-customers might choose to enter
(“arrivers”). The degree of eﬃciency change resulting from these changes on the extensive margin
depends in part on the degree to which the ﬁxed monthly fee departs from the monthly customer-
level ﬁxed costs – the marginal cost of adding an additional customer to the system – beyond the
direct commodity cost. With the volumetric charge set to reﬂect only the commodity cost, all other
utility costs must be captured through the ﬁxed monthly fee. Some of those costs vary with the
number of residential customers served and some are system ﬁxed costs that are mostly unchanged
by the addition of one more residential customer. The distinction between these costs is not always
completely clear, particularly in the long run, but the former category would probably include
monthly paperwork and billing of the customer, meter and other household-level maintenance and
call center staﬃng. The latter category would include maintenance of the main gas pipelines in
the service territory, recovery of past investments in building the pipeline infrastructure, and some
portion of the management budget if there are any scale economies in managing the LDC, which
seems likely.
If the customer-level ﬁxed costs were equal to the LDC’s full non-commodity expenses divided
by the number of customers, then the move to marginal cost pricing of natural gas would also reset
the ﬁxed monthly fee to the eﬃcient level, and all in- and out-migration of customers would be
eﬃcient. Unfortunately, that is not the case; in fact, the monthly incremental cost to the LDC of
36See Ballard and Fullerton (1992) and Snow and Warren (1996).
24managing an additional customer is likely much lower than the ﬁxed monthly fees under marginal
cost pricing that are shown in column 5 of Table 2. Data shared with us by one California utility
indicate that somewhat less than half of non-commodity costs vary signiﬁcantly with number of
subscribing customers within the service territory, though that probably overstates the marginal
cost per customer, because the customer-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs probably exhibit some economies of
scale. As a result, some customers might leave the market even though they receive net surplus in
excess of the monthly incremental (non-commodity) cost they impose on the system.37
A complete empirical investigation of changes on the extensive margin is beyond the scope of
this paper. Still, it could be an important input in the analysis of a switch to marginal cost pricing.
And incorporation of changes on the extensive margin could reduce the estimated eﬃciency gains
from a switch to marginal cost pricing.
To investigate the potential impact of incorporating the extensive margin, we focus ﬁrst on
leavers, customers who use natural gas under the current tariﬀ, but would leave the market under
a rebalancing that substantially increased the ﬁxed monthly fee. Low-consumption customers are
the ones who lose surplus under the rebalanced tariﬀ. For them, the alternative energy source for
all current natural gas services would almost certainly be electricity, which is generally sold with
little or no ﬁxed monthly fee.
To evaluate the impact of leavers on the welfare analysis, we consider ﬁrst the customer’s
energy cost if she switched to electricity to provide the energy services received from natural gas
under the current tariﬀ. This ignores the fact that cooking, space heating, water heating and
clothes drying are not exactly the same services when provided with natural gas as when provided
with electricity. That product diﬀerentiation will almost surely reduce the level of switching in
comparison to a strict cost comparison. This explains why we observe households consuming very
small, but positive quantities of natural gas.
The customers who would leave the natural gas market under the rebalanced tariﬀ are those
who received positive consumer surplus from the current tariﬀ, but negative consumer surplus
under the rebalanced tariﬀ. To analyze who these customers would be, we constructed a simple
model of demand for natural gas that assumes a customer consumes gas along a demand curve
of a given constant elasticity until the price per unit of heat (adjusting for combustion eﬃciency)
with natural gas exceeds the cost of using electricity, at which price the household’s demand drops
discontinuously to zero. Energy services cost includes the volumetric charge, the ﬁxed monthly fee,
and any diﬀerences in the cost of appliances that use the energy. The most important diﬀerence
37Coase (1946) ﬁrst recognized this tension between the eﬃciency costs of raising the ﬁxed monthly fee versus
raising the volumetric charge. Baumol and Bradford (1970) present a technical analysis of the problem.
25in appliance cost is that a natural gas furnace is substantially more expensive than electrical space
heaters. The assumptions we make are shown in Table 7. We show two scenarios, one in which the
household does space heating with natural gas and another in which they do not. Because natural
gas furnaces are more expensive than electrical space heaters, there are many households in mild
climates that choose not to use natural gas heating even though they either face a very low ﬁxed
monthly fee or already pay the ﬁxed monthly fee to use natural gas for other purposes.38 The range
of natural gas usage for which the tariﬀ switch would make natural gas consumption cost-ineﬃcient
is fairly small, so many aﬀected households will be ones that already do not do space heating with
natural gas and will not save on capital cost of a furnace versus electrical space heating. Table 7
indicates that for such houses, consumer surplus increases from dropping natural gas completely
if the household was consuming between and 6 and 17 units (thousand cubic feet) of natural gas
per year. If the household was below 6 units per year it should have already dropped natural gas
under the current tariﬀ, while if it is above 17 units per year, natural gas is still cost eﬀective. If
the household is space heating with natural gas, presumably in a very mild climate, it would also
save on the capital cost of the furnace, as shown. In that case, the range for dropping natural gas
moves to 14-22 thousand cubic feet per year.
These calculations are obviously rough, but they give an idea of the range of consumption
that might lead a household to consider dropping natural gas in response to the tariﬀ change.
The bottom row of the table shows the proportion of households in the RECS data in each range
among households that do and do not use natural gas to for space heating. To infer the potential
deadweight loss from changes on the extensive margin, one would need to know the share of these
customers who would actually choose to drop natural gas – presumably some would not because
of a preference for using natural gas in cooking or other activities. The deadweight loss would also
depend on the share of ﬁxed costs that are customer-speciﬁc as opposed to system level.
We do not attempt to analyze these parameters further, but it is clear from Table 7 that the
impact of changes on the extensive margin could be important. If half of the 4.1 million customers
in the “switch range” did actually switch and if the customer-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs were a small share
of the ﬁxed monthly fee that covers all non-commodity costs, then these switches would result in
deadweight loss that is well over $100 million per year.39 It is not clear that it would reverse the
38In addition, some households do not have access to natural gas either because they live in rural or other areas
with no natural gas distribution pipeline system. From RECS data, it appears that 72% of U.S. households have
access to natural gas and 85% of those with access to natural gas consume positive quantities.
39As an example, assume that customer-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs are equal to the current ﬁxed annual fee of $72. Also
assume that there are no distortions in other markets. Since all leavers are choosing to consume gas under the current
tariﬀ, and since the higher ﬁxed annual fee under marginal cost pricing does not reﬂect costs that actually change
if the customer leaves, then all leavers are doing so ineﬃciently. The deadweight loss of one leaver’s departure is
26result of the analysis that ignored the extensive margin, but it could reduce the gains substantially.
The other side of the extensive margin is “arrivers”, customers who would choose to enter the
market if the tariﬀ changed. We consider, in turn, households substituting away from electric and
heating oil heating systems. A straightforward analysis suggests that the number of households
switching from electricity to natural gas is likely to be extremely small. Such a household must have
chosen not to enter the natural gas market under the current tariﬀ, so it receives negative consumer
surplus under the current tariﬀ. Yet, the lower volumetric charge creates so much more consumer
surplus that it more than oﬀsets the higher ﬁxed monthly fee. In the example in Table 7, ﬁxed fees
increase by $168 per year and the volumetric charge declines $3 per thousand cubic feet. Thus,
a household switching from electricity to natural gas would have to receive at least an additional
$168 per year in consumer surplus due to the price drop. It is possible to derive a demand curve
that satisﬁes both of these conditions – not entering under the current tariﬀ, but entering under
the alternative tariﬀ – but it would have to demonstrate very high elasticity around the current
volumetric charge. For instance, a linear demand curve that exactly satisﬁes this condition would
have a price elasticity of nearly -3 at the current marginal tariﬀ price, far larger than any estimates
of the price elasticities of residential demand for natural gas. While there is probably a non-zero
set of customers who meet these criteria, it seems likely to a very small set.
In contrast, there may be scope for substitution from heating oil to natural gas. Although
only 7% of the households in our data use heating oil as the primary source of home heating, the
fraction among households in the Northeast region is 30%. Heating oil and natural gas heating
systems are similar in that both use a central furnace that is connected to the rest of the house
with air ducts. The capital cost and installation costs are substantial so these systems are favored
by households with relatively high demand for heat. In most locations and time periods the price
per BTU of heating oil exceeds the price per BTU of natural gas. This lower price, combined with
cleanliness and convenience of natural gas, has made it the popular choice for most households.
The one exception is the Northeast, where natural gas prices are the highest in the continental
United States and during some years the price per BTU of natural gas has exceeded the price per
BTU of heating oil. Price reform would decrease volumetric charges enough that it would be very
unusual to observe this inversion in prices. Because the market for heating oil is essentially perfectly
the consumer surplus that she would have received had the volumetric charge been $7 and the ﬁxed annual charge
been $72. For a leaver who had been consuming nearly zero gas, that lost consumer surplus is bounded between zero
and $168, because they would not leave under the new tariﬀ if they would receive more than $168 in surplus. For
a leaver with natural gas demand Q(P), that lost consumer surplus is bounded between $3 · Q(10) (below which he
would have already left under the current tariﬀ) and approximately $168 − $3 · Q(10) +
1
2 ·$3· (Q(7) − Q(10)). This
is essentially a narrower range centered between zero and $168. Taking the midpoint of $84 per year and multiplying
by
4.1
2 million leavers yields approximately $170 million per year in deadweight loss.
27competitive, substitutions awayfrom heating oil towardnatural gas would represent eﬃciency gains.
6.3 The Impact of Distortions in Related Markets
The analysis thus far rests on the assumption that prices in the rest of the economy are set
eﬃciently. This is of particular concern if the prices of complementary and substitute products are
also distorted. The three markets that are of greatest potential concern are heating oil and elec-
tricity, both of which are substitutes, and greenhouse gases, which is a complement in consumption
of natural gas. We consider the ﬁrst two in the absence of considering greenhouse gas externalities,
and then turn speciﬁcally to greenhouse gases at the end of the section.
While7% of all households use heating oil as their primaryhome heating fuel, this is a reasonably
competitive market in which price reﬂects marginal cost quite closely.40 Thus, substitution to or
from heating oil in response to a rebalancing of natural gas rates is unlikely to impose additional
distortions. Electricity is a more complex issue as prices around the country diﬀer from marginal
cost, in some cases substantially. Residential prices for electricity are generally established through
a regulatory process that sets rates in order to allow the utility to recover its historical costs, thus
prices reﬂect an historical average cost.41 In some areas of the country price is below marginal cost
as the utilities are able to average in cheap sources that would be a small share of marginal expansion
– such as large hydroelectric projects – or older fossil fuel sources that have been depreciated in
the accounting sense, so they are assigned a very low cost in the ratemaking process – such as
older coal and natural gas plants. In other parts of the country, prices are well above marginal
cost as the rates are being set to cover mistakes of the past, such as cost overruns on nuclear (and
other) power plants, and costs incurred from unsuccessful deregulation plans or poorly-designed
attempts at competitive procurement. In addition, throughout the country, residential rates are
set to cover costs of transmission and distribution systems, much of which are do not vary with
marginal consumption. A complete analysis of the distortion from substitution between electricity
and natural gas, on both the intensive and extensive margin, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Still, it seems likely that prices are generally above marginal cost of electricity, so to the extent
that rebalancing natural gas rates causes substitution from electricity to natural gas, our estimates
40One might argue that OPEC or, more exactly, Saudi Arabia, exercises market power and raises oil prices above
competitive levels. Nonetheless, if the goal is to maximize US surplus, then it probably makes sense to treat these as
exogenous quantity constraints, with all other producers acting as price takers in the oil market. Downstream from
oil, in the reﬁning and distribution sectors, sellers are generally thought to be quite competitive.
41This description is not entirely accurate in areas where there is competition among retail providers, but even
in those areas transmission and distribution costs are still recovered through regulated charges that are set to cover
average cost, and adjustments to retail prices are made to allow recovery of revenues that are necessary to cover other
historical costs.
28of eﬃciency gains would need to be adjusted downwards.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant related distortion is the fact the greenhouse gas emissions are
currently free. Rates for natural gas do not reﬂect the negative externality that burning the gas
creates. It is interesting to compare the average markup on natural gas that we have calculated
with the price increase that would be implied by a carbon tax. Table 2 reports an average markup
in the United States in 2005 of $2.71 per thousand cubic feet. There are .0543 metric tons of carbon
dioxide per thousand cubic feet of natural gas, so this average markup is equivalent to a tax of
about $50 per ton of carbon dioxide. This is higher than the level of a carbon tax envisioned by
most economists and policy makers. As a point of comparison, Federal Interagency Working Group
(2010) adopts a central social cost of carbon dioxide of $22 for 2015.42 Compared to this measure,
current markups exceed the external cost of natural gas consumption, so residential customers may
already face a volumetric charge that exceeds social marginal cost.
Table 8 reports eﬃciency gains under alternative assumptions about greenhouse gas emissions
and policy. The results in the paper up until this point implicitly assume that there are no exter-
nalities from the production or consumption of natural gas, and that there is no policy in place
such as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program that places an implicit price on these emissions.
Row (1) reports mean annual eﬃciency gains by needs-adjusted household income quintile under
this baseline scenario for a price elasticity of demand of -0.4. These eﬃciency gains are identical to
the implied gains comparing the ￿ = 0 and ￿ = −0.4 columns in Table 6.
Row (2) shows that, assuming that carbon dioxide emissions remain unpriced, but are truly
costly to society, then the potential eﬃciency gains from marginal cost pricing are reduced by about
60%. In this scenario, volumetric charges are set equal to social marginal cost, equal to private
marginal cost plus external damages which we assume are equal to $22 per ton of carbon dioxide.
Here the welfare gains from price reform, or equivalently, the ineﬃciency of current price schedules
is considerably smaller because incorporating marginal damages reduces the wedge between current
volumetric charges and the proper measure of marginal cost. Of course, if the true social cost of
carbon dioxide is more than $50 per ton, then even the current rate structure places a marginal
price on natural gas consumption that is too low.
42Federal Interagency Working Group (2010) presents a range of values for the social cost of carbon dioxide accord-
ing to diﬀerent discount rates and for diﬀerent time periods that is intended to capture changes in net agricultural
productivity, human health, property damages from increased ﬂood risk, and other factors. In Table 15A.1.1 with a
3% discount rate (their “central value”) for 2010 they ﬁnd a social cost of carbon dioxide of $21.40 (in 2007 dollars)
per metric ton of carbon dioxide. In 2010 dollars this is approximately $22. To avoid confusion we use carbon
dioxide, rather than carbon, throughout. Because the atomic weight of carbon is 12 atomic mass units, while the
weight of carbon dioxide is 44, one ton of carbon equals 44/12 tons of carbon dioxide. The average markup of $2.71
is equivalent to a tax of $50 per ton of carbon dioxide or $183 per ton of carbon.
29Row (3) considers the scenario in which again carbon dioxide emissions are assumed to impose
external damages of $22 per ton of carbon dioxide, but there is also assumed to be a carbon tax
or cap-and-trade program in place that puts a price of $22 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions.
We assume that this policy increases the volumetric charge faced by residential customers by the
equivalent of $22 per ton of carbon dioxide. Here the eﬃciency gains from marginal cost pricing
are very similar in magnitude to the gains observed in row (1). This scenario illustrates that the
distortion we have addressed in this paper would still be present if carbon dioxide emissions were
priced to reﬂect the negative externality. The ﬁxed costs of operating a natural gas distribution
system would still have to be recovered and the policy argument over whether to recover them
through ﬁxed or volumetric charges would be essentially the same as if there were no negative
externality.
6.4 To Which Price Do Customers Respond?
The discussion and analysis thus far in Section 6 maintains the implicit assumption that house-
holds have perfect information and respond optimally in response to two-part tariﬀs. These may
not be reasonable assumptions. Although natural gas bills typically are reasonably clear about
the distinction between the ﬁxed monthly fee and the volumetric charge, many customers have not
thought much about the distinction.
Customers who are not aware of, or do not understand the two-part tariﬀ might instead respond
to the total bill, rather than the volumetric charge. Recent empirical evidence from the electricity
market provides some evidence for this alternative hypothesis. Focusing on the California elec-
tricity market, Ito (2010) ﬁnds evidence consistent with households responding to average, rather
than marginal prices. Although these results are compelling, it is important to point out that in
the market examined in Ito (2010) households face four- and ﬁve-part increasing block tariﬀs. In
comparison, the typical natural gas schedule is substantially less complex with most natural gas
LDCs using only a ﬁxed monthly fee and a single, constant, volumetric charge. Given this consid-
erably simpler structure it seems likely that households would be better able to distinguish between
average price and marginal price. This lends some support to our baseline estimates which assume
households respond to marginal price.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to consider how the welfare implications would change under the
alternative hypothesis that households respond to average prices. Under a transition to marginal
cost pricing households with high consumption levels would experience decreases in both average
and marginal price, implying welfare gains regardless of how well the customer understands the
30tariﬀ. In contrast, households with low consumption levels would see decreases in marginal price
but increases in average price, potentially moving consumption in the wrong direction. The total
change in welfare could, in theory, be positive or negative.
Repeating the analysis in Section 6.1 under the assumption that households respond to average
price rather than marginal price, we ﬁnd that the overall change in welfare from a transition to
marginal cost pricing is still positive, but considerably smaller in magnitude. With a -0.4 price
elasticity of demand, we ﬁnd an increase in total welfare nationally of $223 million annually, com-
pared to $644 million annually in the original analysis. About half of all households experience a
decrease in average price under a transition to marginal cost pricing, but the net welfare change
is positive because we ﬁnd that the increases in welfare for households experiencing average price
decreases (high-consumption households) tend to be larger than the decreases in welfare for house-
holds experiencing average price increases (low-consumption households).
Overall, it seems clear that if customers indeed respond to average price rather than marginal
price, then the welfare gain from rebalancing natural gas rates could be substantially smaller
than the baseline estimates in Section 6.1. This raises the question of customer education, and
whether changes in the way that bills are designed could have impacts on household welfare. In
particular, after a transition to marginal cost pricing it would be important for natural gas LDCs
to make every eﬀort to describe the reform to the public as clearly as possible, and to strive to
make bills as transparent as possible, distinguishing between marginal and average prices using
easy-to-understand language, ﬁgures and examples.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we used nationally-representative microdata to characterize the eﬀect of a tran-
sition to marginal cost pricing in the U.S. natural gas market. The results conﬁrm a widespread
perception in the industry and among regulators and consumer protection groups that price reform
would have negative distributional consequences. However, our results indicate that the magnitude
of these eﬀects is relatively small. What matters for distributional consequences is the correlation
between household income and natural gas consumption. We show that this relationship is positive,
but weak, so that current price schedules deliver a modest amount of redistribution. Needs-based
programs, such as LIHEAP, could likely reduce the negative impacts to vulnerable subgroups sub-
stantially.
Our analysis highlights a number of confounding factors that weaken the relationship between
31energy consumption and income, complicating attempts to accomplish distributional goals through
price schedules. For example, we show that household income is positively correlated with energy
eﬃciency. Part of this is likely driven by the landlord-tenant problem, which leads to suboptimal en-
ergy eﬃciency investment in rental properties, though the correlation holds within owner-occupied
housing units as well. In addition, households in the bottom quintiles of income or needs-adjusted
income tend to have more children and we show that, in particular, low-income households with
multiple children tend to have high levels of natural gas consumption and thus would tend to beneﬁt
from marginal cost pricing.
The broader conclusion of our paper is that it is important for policymakers to keep in mind
this tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and equity when implementing rate structures. The reality is that
whenever policymakers can inﬂuence prices there is a temptation to use these prices to accomplish
distributional goals. This is despite the fact that economists generally view optimal tariﬀ design as
separate from redistribution, particularly when there are broader redistributive tools in place such
as the income tax. Striking a balance between these two objectives is perhaps the biggest challenge
faced by utility regulators, and it is surprising that there is so little empirical evidence on the topic.
Studies like this one are important because they move us closer to understanding the sometimes
complex distribution and eﬃciency implications of price schedules and because they demonstrate
that analyses using real-world data can reveal important evidence about the magnitude of these
eﬀects.
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37Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Needs-Adjusted Household Income Quintiles
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
A. Household Economic and Demographic Characteristics
Percent of Poverty Line <148% 148-235% 235-334% 334-514% >514%
Mean Annual Household Income (1000s) $16.5 $32.3 $46.7 $65.3 $129.8
(8.9) (12.0) (15.8) (20.8) (44.1)
Number of Household Members 2.75 2.86 2.71 2.50 2.47
(1.92) (1.61) (1.51) (1.32) (1.17)
Number of Children 0.94 0.85 0.78 0.61 0.52
(1.38) (1.14) (1.08) (0.97) (0.92)
Proportion Homeowner 0.49 0.66 0.77 0.85 0.91
(0.50) (0.47) (0.42) (0.36) (0.29)
Proportion Receives Energy Assistance 0.18 0.06 0.0 0.0 0.0
(0.38) (0.24) (0) (0) (0)
B. Natural Gas Consumption and Expenditure
Mean Annual Consumption (cubic feet, 1000s) 61.1 68.2 66.7 67.9 80.9
(47.8) (44.1) (40.7) (41.6) (47.9)
Mean Annual Expenditure $743 $823 $807 $854 $993
(588) (533) (476) (550) (586)
Expenditure as a Fraction of Income 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
C. Energy Eﬃciency
Main Heating System is Less than 10 Years Old 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.48 0.50
(0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Home is Well Insulated 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.45
(0.46) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Double-Pane Windows 0.38 0.51 0.62 0.60 0.70
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.46)
Note: These data come from the 2005 Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS). The sample includes all households
with a natural gas connection excluding renters living in housing units where utilities are included in the rent. The result-
ing sample includes 2,555 households, or approximately 500 households per quintile. Means and standard deviations (in
parentheses) are calculated using RECS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in year 2010 dollars.
38Table 2: Natural Gas Rate Schedules By Region
Current Rate Schedule Rate Schedule After Rebalancing
Volumetric Fixed Volumetric Fixed
Charge Monthly Fee Charge Monthly Fee
(Marginal Cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Northeast $12.60 $5.82 $10.04 $24.20
(0.38) (2.10) (1.37)
Midwest $9.90 $10.90 $8.57 $20.03
(0.44) (2.75) (0.68)
South $11.97 $4.22 $8.58 $19.67
(0.46) (1.90) (0.93)
West $11.47 $2.69 $7.61 $17.92
(0.26) (0.96) (0.58)
Average $11.34 $6.20 $8.63 $20.24
(0.20) (1.05) (0.44)
Note: Column (1) is the mean volumetric charge for current rate schedules in the RECS data per 1000
cubic feet. Column (2) is the mean ﬁxed monthly fee for current rate schedules in the RECS data.
Column (3) is the mean city gate price from Platts per 1000 cubic feet. Finally, column (4) calculates
the ﬁxed monthly fee that would be required to maintain the same level of revenue if the volumetric
charge were decreased to marginal cost. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications are
shown in parentheses. All calculations are made using RECS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are
expressed in year 2010 dollars.
39Table 3: The Distributional Impact of a Change to Marginal Cost Pricing
Percent Mean
Mean Annual Experiencing Bill Change
Change in Dollars Bill Increase in Percent
A. By Household Income Quintile
1st Quintile $44.39 (9.79) 66.7% (2.3) 6.1% (1.5)
2nd Quintile $23.26 (9.69) 60.2% (2.5) 2.9% (1.3)
3rd Quintile $8.20 (10.19) 53.7% (2.4) 1.0% (1.3)
4th Quintile -$19.04 (11.37) 49.2% (2.6) -2.1% (1.2)
5th Quintile -$58.45 (10.93) 39.0% (2.4) -5.9% (1.0)
B. By Needs-Adjusted Household Income Quintile
1st Quintile $29.70 (10.05) 64.7% (2.3) 4.0% (1.4)
2nd Quintile $28.16 (9.73) 59.9% (2.4) 3.5% (1.3)
3rd Quintile $12.44 (9.70) 54.8% (2.5) 1.5% (1.2)
4th Quintile -$16.47 (11.07) 50.4% (2.6) -1.9% (1.3)
5th Quintile -$54.97 (10.52) 39.2% (2.4) -5.6% (1.0)
C. Households with Children
All Households with Children -$21.19 (6.20) 52.1% (1.5) -2.3% (0.7)
Households with One Child -$1.34 (10.94) 53.9% (2.7) -0.2% (1.3)
Households with Two Children -$33.63 (12.17) 53.5% (2.6) -3.6% (1.2)
Households with Three or More Children -$33.72 (16.37) 46.4% (3.6) -3.5% (1.6)
D. Low-Income Households with Children
Households with Children $2.80 (18.47) 65.5% (3.4) 0.3% (2.2)
Households with One Child $65.68 (21.68) 73.7% (6.0) 10.1% (3.8)
Households with Two Children -$24.96 (36.58) 64.3% (5.9) -2.7% (3.8)
Households with Three or More Children -$29.94 (32.31) 58.2% (6.4) -3.2% (3.3)
Note: This table reports how household expenditure on natural gas would change under marginal cost pricing. Boot-
strap standard errors based on 1000 replications are shown in parentheses. All calculations are made using RECS
sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in year 2010 dollars. In panel (D) low-income is deﬁned as households
in the lowest quintile by needs-adjusted household income.
40Table 4: Natural Gas Expenditure as a Share of Household Income
(1) (2) (3)
Under Current Under Marginal p-value
Price Schedules Cost Pricing (1) vs (2)
A. By Household Income Quintile
1st Quintile 6.7% 7.1% .00
2nd Quintile 2.8% 2.9% .02
3rd Quintile 1.8% 1.8% .46
4th Quintile 1.4% 1.3% .24
5th Quintile 0.8% 0.7% .00
B. By Needs-Adjusted Household Income Quintile
1st Quintile 6.5% 6.8% .01
2nd Quintile 2.8% 2.9% .00
3rd Quintile 1.9% 1.9% .09
4th Quintile 1.4% 1.4% .34
5th Quintile 0.9% 0.8% .00
Note: This table reports natural gas expenditure as a share of household income under
current price schedules and marginal cost pricing. Column (3) reports p-values from tests
that the means in columns (1) and (2) are equal. All calculations are made using RECS
sampling weights.
41Table 5: The Impact on Households Below 150% of Poverty Line
Mean Annual Mean Share Who Annual Cost
Change Change Receive Per Non-
(in Dollars) (in Percent) Beneﬁts Recipient
(1) No Energy Assistance Program $29.70 4.0% 0.0% $0.0
(10.05) (1.4) (0.0) (0.0)
(2) Zero Fixed Monthly Fee for Households -$210.14 -28.0% 20.0% $60.07
Below 150% Poverty Line (100% takeup) (11.41) (1.0) (0.1) (1.52)
(3) $10 Monthly Lump Sum Payment for Households -$90.30 -12.0% 20.0% $30.06
Below 150% Poverty Line (100% takeup) (10.05) (1.1) (0.1) (0.23)
(4) $10 Monthly Lump Sum Payment for Households -$30.30 -4.0% 10.0% $13.36
Below 150% Poverty Line (50% takeup) (10.05) (1.2) (0.1) (0.09)
(5) $10 Monthly Lump Sum Payment for Households $5.70 0.8% 4.0% $5.01
Below 150% Poverty Line (20% takeup) (10.05) (1.4) (0.0) (0.03)
(6) $10 Monthly Lump Sum Payment for Households -$24.25 -3.2% 27.6% $45.65
in Multi-Unit Buildings (10.19) (1.3) (1.0) (2.34)
Note: This table reports how householdexpenditureon natural gas would changeunder marginal cost pricing for house-
holds below 150% of the poverty line. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications are shown in parentheses.
All calculations are made using RECS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in year 2010 dollars.
42Table 6: Consumer Surplus Impact of a Change to Marginal Cost Pricing
Mean Annual Change in Consumer Surplus
￿=0 ￿=-0.2 ￿=-0.4 ￿=-0.6
By Needs-Adjusted Household Income Quintile:
1st Quintile -$29.70 -$25.54 -$21.17 -$16.60
(10.05) (10.10) (10.32) (10.11)
2nd Quintile -$28.16 -$23.66 -$18.94 -$14.01
(9.73) (9.97) (10.16) (9.89)
3rd Quintile -$12.44 -$7.88 -$3.10 $1.91
(9.70) (9.81) (9.92) (9.71)
4th Quintile $16.47 $21.46 $26.68 $32.15
(11.07) (11.12) (11.20) (11.61)
5th Quintile $54.97 $61.72 $68.82 $76.28
(10.52) (11.24) (11.75) (11.90)
Average Across Quintiles $0.00 $4.99 $10.21 $15.69
(0.00) (0.59) (1.21) (1.87)
Percent of Households Better Oﬀ 46.2% 47.5% 48.5% 49.6%
(0.9) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8)
Total National Change in Welfare $0 $314 $644 $989
(In Millions, Annually) (0.0) (37) (76) (118)
Note: This table reports how consumer surplus would change under marginal cost pricing. The table reports
results separately by needs-adjusted household income quintile for four alternative assumptions about the
price elasticity of demand for natural gas. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications are shown
in parentheses. All calculations are made using RECS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in
year 2010 dollars.
43Table 7: Evaluating Potential “Leavers” Under Marginal Cost Pricing
Gas Space No Gas
Heating Space Heating
Assumptions:
Cost of Electricity ($/kWh) $0.10 $0.10
kWH per thousand cubic feet 293 293
Eﬃciency of Natural Gas Appliances 0.80 0.80
Choke-oﬀ Price for Gas ($/thousand cubic feet) $23.44 $23.44
Current Volumetric Charge for Natural Gas $10.00 $10.00
Volumetric Charge Under Marginal Cost Pricing $7.00 $7.00
Current Fixed Annual Fee $72.00 $72.00
Fixed Annual Fee Under Marginal Cost Pricing $240.00 $240.00
Annual Fixed Cost of Natural Gas Furnace $100.00 $0.00
Annual Fixed Cost of Electric Heat $20.00 $0.00
Elasticity of Demand -0.40 -0.40
Results:
Breakeven Consumption Under Current Tariﬀ 14 6
Breakeven Consumption Under Marginal Cost Pricing 22 17
Proportion of Households in this Category with Natural 0.03 0.26
Gas Consumption Levels Between Two Breakeven Levels
Implied Total Number of Households in U.S. (millions) 1.65 2.41
Note: Consumption is annual consumption of natural gas in thousands of cubic feet. Dollar
amounts are expressed in year 2010 dollars.
44Table 8: Alternative Assumptions About Greenhouse Gases
Mean Annual Eﬃciency Gain By Quintile
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Average
Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Across
Quintiles
(1) No Externalities, $8.53 $9.22 $9.33 $10.21 $13.86 $10.21
No Greenhouse Gas Policy (1.15) (1.14) (1.13) (1.29) (1.90) (1.21)
(2) External Cost of CO2 Emissions of $22, $3.34 $3.50 $3.68 $4.01 $5.86 $4.07
No Greenhouse Gas Policy (0.67) (0.65) (0.65) (0.77) (1.20) (0.73)
(3) External Cost of CO2 Emissions of $22, $7.64 $8.26 $8.36 $9.14 $12.42 $9.15
Tax (or permit) on Carbon Dioxide of $22 (1.04) (1.03) (1.02) (1.17) (1.72) (1.09)
Note: This table reports the mean annual eﬃciency gain per household under a transition to marginal cost pricing for
alternative assumptions about carbon dioxide emissions and policies. The table reports results separately by needs-
adjusted household income quintile and for the average across quintiles. External damages of $22 per ton of carbon
dioxide are adopted following Federal Interagency Working Group (2010). All results assume that the price elasticity of
demand is -0.4. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications are shown in parentheses. All calculationsare made
using RECS sampling weights. Eﬃciency gains are expressed in year 2010 dollars.
45Appendix A: Results For California Using Alternative Data
Appendix A
Results For California Using Alternative Data
In this section we present results using an alternative dataset from the Residential Appliance
Saturation Survey (RASS), a household-level survey conducted in 2003 by the California Energy
Commission. The RASS provides household-level demographics, natural gas consumption, and
the exact utility district for a representative sample of households in California. We collected
actual utility rate schedules for Paciﬁc Gas and Electric, San Diego Gas and Electric, and Southern
California Gas by contacting the utilities directly. These three utilities represent 97% of residential
sales of natural gas in California. Table A1 provides descriptive statistics. We then calculated
the revenue neutral, marginal-cost price schedule for each utility. Table A2 reports price schedules
separately by utility and for the state as a whole. Markups are considerably higher in California
than the national average, reﬂecting relatively low city gate prices in 2003 and the fact that the
typical household in California uses less natural gas than the typical household nationwide. The rest
of the tables describe the distributional impacts of a change to marginal cost pricing. The general
pattern of the results is similar to our main results in Table 3. Under marginal cost pricing low-
income households would tend to pay somewhat more and high-income households and households
with children would tend to pay somewhat less. This pattern holds for the state as a whole in Table
A3, and for each utility separately in Tables A4, A5, and A6.
46Appendix A: Results For California Using Alternative Data
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49Appendix A: Results For California Using Alternative Data
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics from RASS by Percent of Poverty Line Quintiles
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
<190% 190-307% 308-426% 427-612% >613%
A. Household Economic and Demographic Characteristics
Mean Annual Household Income (1000s) 26.88 47.54 66.35 86.47 136.78
(13.51) (17.22) (19.78) (28.06) (30.01)
Number of Household Members 3.90 3.24 2.92 2.55 2.45
(2.33) (1.65) (1.33) (1.34) (1.01)
Number of Children 1.45 1.03 0.78 0.55 0.44
(1.61) (1.26) (0.98) (1.01) (0.79)
Proportion Homeowners 0.46 0.70 0.81 0.90 0.92
(0.50) (0.46) (0.39) (0.30) (0.26)
B. Natural Gas Consumption and Expenditure
Mean Annual Consumption (cubic feet, 1000s) 42.00 46.03 46.96 50.46 61.52
(29.49) (23.78) (26.22) (30.79) (40.91)
Mean Annual Expenditure 361.20 397.23 408.31 442.24 544.81
(267.17) (215.03) (240.69) (297.13) (394.06)
Expenditure as a Fraction of Income 0.02 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.004
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
C. Energy Eﬃciency
Main Heating System is Less than 9 Years Old 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.38
(0.45) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49)
All Exterior Walls are Insulated 0.43 0.51 0.52 0.61 0.63
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48)
Some or All Exterior Walls are Insulated 0.58 0.69 0.70 0.77 0.80
(0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.42) (0.40)
Ceiling/Attic is Insulated 0.52 0.70 0.74 0.82 0.83
(0.50) (0.46) (0.44) (0.38) (0.37)
All Windows are Double-Pane 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.46 0.48
(0.43) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Some or All Windows are Double-Pane 0.34 0.42 0.50 0.56 0.60
(0.47) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Note: Summary statistics are reported only for those households (n=11,722) that answered every question of
interest. Data are from the 2003 California Residential Appliance Saturation Study (RASS). Means and standard
deviations (in parentheses) are calculated using RASS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in year
2010 dollars.
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Table A2: Natural Gas Rate Schedules in California, by Utility
Current Rate Schedule Rate Schedule After Rebalancing
Volumetric
Charge Fixed Volumetric Fixed
Below and Monthly Fee Charge Monthly Fee
Above Baseline (Marginal Cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Paciﬁc Gas and Electric (PGE) $7.71 $0.00 $4.31 $15.45
$10.08
San Diego Gas and Electric (SDGE) $9.30 $0.00 $4.31 $17.97
$11.29
Southern California Gas Company (SCG) $6.94 $6.05 $4.31 $18.22
$9.14
Consumption-Weighted Average $7.50 $2.97 $4.31 $17.06
$9.74
Note: Sample size is 6,745 for PGE, 1,670 for SDGE, and 7,582 for SCG. Column (1) is the mean volumetric charge per 1000
cubic feet for current rate schedules both below and above baseline as reported by the LDCs. Column (2) is the monthly ﬁxed
fee for the current rate schedules, as reported by the LDCs. Column (3) is the mean city gate price from Platts, calculated
as the consumption-weighted mean of monthly California prices. Finally, column (4) calculates the annual fee that would
be required to maintain the same level of revenue if volumetric charges were decreased to marginal cost. The calculations
in column (4) ignore that PGE currently oﬀers a discount to multi-family homes of approximately 10 cents per day. All
calculations are made using RASS sampling weights.
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Table A3: The Distributional Impact of Marginal Cost Pricing, All California Utilities
Percent Mean
Mean Annual Experiencing Bill Change
Change in Dollars Bill Increase in Percent
A. By Household Income Quintile
1st Quintile (<$32,000) $40.46 (4.68) 73.1% (1.7) 12.3% (1.8)
2nd Quintile ($32,000-$47,000) $34.90 (4.42) 73.3% (1.8) 10.3% (1.6)
3rd Quintile ($47,000-$68,000) $15.05 (5.26) 67.6% (1.9) 4.0% (1.5)
4th Quintile ($68,000-$92,000) -$15.42 (4.71) 54.2% (1.9) -3.5% (1.0)
5th Quintile (>$92,000) -$77.03 (6.43) 43.8% (2.0) -14.1% (0.9)
B. By Percent of Poverty Line Quintile
1st Quintile (<165%) $31.68 (5.00) 70.5% (1.8) 9.1% (1.7)
2nd Quintile (165%-281%) $21.77 (4.44) 67.8% (1.8) 6.0% (1.4)
3rd Quintile (281%-412%) $11.60 (4.96) 64.4% (2.0) 3.0% (1.4)
4th Quintile (412%-587%) -$11.31 (5.41) 58.4% (1.9) -2.7% (1.2)
5th Quintile (>587%) -$61.64 (7.40) 49.3% (2.1) -11.9% (1.1)
C. Households with Children
All Households with Children -$10.70 (2.94) 58.1% (1.2) -2.5% (0.7)
Households with One Child $2.40 (6.04) 64.9% (2.0) 0.6% (1.5)
Households with Two Children -$17.78 (5.69) 53.6% (2.3) -4.0% (1.2)
Households with Three or More Children -$20.58 (7.45) 54.3% (2.6) -4.6% (1.5)
D. Low-Income Households with Children
Households with Children $28.26 (6.17) 68.1% (2.5) 8.0% (2.0)
Households with One Child $49.58 (10.54) 74.4% (4.5) 15.8% (4.4)
Households with Two Children $37.85 (9.98) 70.3% (4.7) 11.3% (3.6)
Households with Three or More Children $8.54 (10.18) 62.8% (3.9) 2.2% (2.7)
Note: The sample used for this table includes all households in the 2003 Residential Appliance Satura-
tion Survey who use natural gas. A small number of households were dropped for whom demographic
information were not available. This table reports how household expenditure on natural gas would
change under marginal cost pricing. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications are shown in
parentheses. All calculations are made using RASS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in
year 2010 dollars.
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Table A4: The Distributional Impact of Marginal Cost Pricing, Paciﬁc Gas and Electric
Percent Mean
Mean Annual Experiencing Bill Change
Change in Dollars Bill Increase in Percent
A. By Household Income Quintile
1st Quintile (<$32,000) $57.39 (6.88) 74.1% (2.6) 19.4% (3.1)
2nd Quintile ($32,000-$47,000) $43.02 (6.88) 75.7% (2.7) 13.2% (2.6)
3rd Quintile ($47,000-$68,000) $20.72 (7.77) 64.4% (2.8) 5.7% (2.3)
4th Quintile ($68,000-$92,000) -$28.20 (8.76) 51.8% (2.8) -6.2% (1.7)
5th Quintile (>$92,000) -$82.24 (9.01) 43.7% (2.5) -15.0% (1.2)
B. By Percent of Poverty Line Quintile
1st Quintile (<165%) $55.75 (7.33) 74.0% (2.9) 18.6% (3.2)
2nd Quintile (165%-281%) $21.90 (7.39) 67.9% (2.9) 6.0% (2.3)
3rd Quintile (281%-412%) $10.12 (9.48) 63.4% (2.9) 2.7% (2.5)
4th Quintile (412%-587%) -$16.28 (8.81) 53.7% (2.9) -3.8% (1.9)
5th Quintile (>587%) -$68.54 (10.65) 49.1% (2.6) -13.1% (1.6)
C. Households with Children
All Households with Children -$8.80 (4.70) 56.5% (1.9) -2.1% (1.1)
Households with One Child $5.34 (10.48) 64.0% (3.1) 1.4% (2.8)
Households with Two Children -$17.51 (7.84) 51.0% (3.4) -4.0% (1.7)
Households with Three or More Children -$17.91 (11.95) 52.9% (4.4) -4.1% (2.6)
D. Low-Income Households with Children
Households with Children $52.95 (9.35) 72.6% (3.9) 17.2% (4.0)
Households with One Child $102.16 (11.77) 87.7% (4.8) 48.3% (11.0)
Households with Two Children $47.86 (16.02) 70.8% (7.5) 14.8% (6.5)
Households with Three or More Children $19.21 (16.44) 62.4% (7.0) 5.2% (5.0)
Note: The sample used for this table includesall Paciﬁc Gas and Electric customers in the 2003 Residential
Appliance Saturation Survey who use natural gas. A small number of households were dropped for whom
demographic information were not available. This table reports how householdexpenditureon natural gas
would changeunder marginal cost pricing. Bootstrap standarderrors based on 1000 replicationsare shown
in parentheses. All calculations are made using RASS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in
year 2010 dollars.
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Table A5: The Distributional Impact of Marginal Cost Pricing, San Diego Gas and Electric
Percent Mean
Mean Annual Experiencing Bill Change
Change in Dollars Bill Increase in Percent
A. By Household Income Quintile
1st Quintile (<$32,000) $70.06 (16.81) 79.8% (6.0) 26.5% (8.8)
2nd Quintile ($32,000-$47,000) $59.70 (16.37) 74.6% (5.8) 21.2% (7.6)
3rd Quintile ($47,000-$68,000) $10.37 (33.22) 74.3% (5.1) 2.8% (9.1)
4th Quintile ($68,000-$92,000) $6.81 (14.76) 62.0% (6.5) 1.8% (4.0)
5th Quintile (>$92,000) -$109.22 (24.70) 43.7% (5.1) -19.3% (2.8)
B. By Percent of Poverty Line Quintile
1st Quintile (<165%) $66.22 (20.15) 78.2% (6.4) 24.6% (10.6)
2nd Quintile (165%-281%) $44.23 (17.42) 69.5% (6.1) 14.4% (6.9)
3rd Quintile (281%-412%) $41.71 (13.03) 72.1% (6.6) 13.2% (4.5)
4th Quintile (412%-587%) -$5.34 (19.37) 67.8% (5.1) -1.4% (4.6)
5th Quintile (>587%) -$103.13 (26.83) 44.3% (5.4) -18.6% (3.2)
C. Households with Children
All Households with Children -$22.00 (14.85) 62.3% (3.7) -5.2% (3.2)
Households with One Child $3.05 (31.77) 74.6% (6.1) 0.8% (8.4)
Households with Two Children -$28.32 (21.20) 53.1% (7.1) -6.6% (4.5)
Households with Three or More Children -$58.92 (56.19) 55.5% (9.3) -12.3% (9.8)
D. Low-Income Households with Children
Households with Children $40.34 (33.23) 67.2% (11.0) 12.9% (14.0)
Households with One Child $99.02 (39.50) 83.7% (11.3) 47.0% (27.6)
Households with Two Children $21.44 (49.36) 65.4% (18.7) 6.2% (19.9)
Households with Three or More Children $29.27 (60.85) 59.7% (18.2) 8.9% (27.8)
Note: The sample used for this table includes all San Diego Gas and Electric customers in the 2003
Residential Appliance Saturation Survey who use natural gas. A small number of households were dropped
for whom demographic information were not available. This table reports how household expenditure on
natural gas would change under marginal cost pricing. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications
are shown in parentheses. All calculations are made using RASS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are
expressed in year 2010 dollars.
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Table A6: The Distributional Impact of Marginal Cost Pricing, Southern California Gas
Percent Mean
Mean Annual Experiencing Bill Change
Change in Dollars Bill Increase in Percent
A. By Household Income Quintile
1st Quintile (<$32,000) $22.71 (6.47) 71.3% (2.3) 6.2% (2.0)
2nd Quintile ($32,000-$47,000) $23.83 (6.10) 71.1% (2.6) 6.6% (1.9)
3rd Quintile ($47,000-$68,000) $11.83 (6.07) 68.8% (2.6) 3.0% (1.6)
4th Quintile ($68,000-$92,000) -$9.93 (4.93) 54.3% (2.8) -2.3% (1.1)
5th Quintile (>$92,000) -$62.01 (8.52) 44.0% (3.3) -11.5% (1.2)
B. By Percent of Poverty Line Quintile
1st Quintile (<165%) $11.46 (6.80) 67.4% (2.4) 3.0% (1.9)
2nd Quintile (165%-281%) $17.44 (5.52) 67.4% (2.6) 4.6% (1.6)
3rd Quintile (281%-412%) $7.55 (5.43) 63.8% (2.5) 1.9% (1.4)
4th Quintile (412%-587%) -$8.19 (6.35) 60.3% (2.9) -1.9% (1.4)
5th Quintile (>587%) -$43.05 (8.09) 50.9% (3.1) -8.6% (1.3)
C. Households with Children
All Households with Children -$10.17 (3.34) 58.7% (1.7) -2.3% (0.7)
Households with One Child $0.03 (6.44) 63.8% (2.8) 0.0% (1.6)
Households with Two Children -$15.78 (8.52) 56.0% (3.1) -3.6% (1.8)
Households with Three or More Children -$17.46 (7.88) 54.9% (3.3) -3.9% (1.6)
D. Low-Income Households with Children
Households with Children $11.32 (7.50) 65.4% (3.2) 2.9% (2.0)
Households with One Child $8.96 (13.41) 64.3% (6.5) 2.3% (3.6)
Households with Two Children $32.69 (10.73) 70.8% (6.0) 9.5% (3.8)
Households with Three or More Children $1.51 (12.73) 63.2% (4.8) 0.4% (3.1)
Note: The sample used for this table includes all Southern California Gas customers in the 2003 Residen-
tial Appliance Saturation Survey. A small number of households were dropped for whom demographic
information were not available. This table reports how household expenditure on natural gas would
change under marginal cost pricing. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications are shown in
parentheses. All calculations are made using RASS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in
year 2010 dollars.
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Appendix B
An Alternative Measure of Household Resources
In this appendix we repeat the counterfactual bill analysis using what we argue is a more
permanent measure of household resources. Because income varies over the life-cycle, many studies
have pointed out that welfare analyses using annual income may be misleading. See, e.g., Poterba
(1989), Poterba (1991), and Cutler and Katz (1992). Annual income is typically low early and late
in life but households with access to credit markets or other forms of intertemporal borrowing can
smooth their consumption. The goal of redistributive policy is to transfer resources to truly needy
households so a program that sends money to, for example, college students with high permanent
income and wealthy retirees would not be viewed as socially desirable.
Previous studies have used a variety of approaches to construct more permanent measures of
household resources. Some studies have argued that expenditure provides a more accurate measure
of household well-being than income. For example, Poterba (1989) and Poterba (1991) examine
the distributional impact of gasoline, alcohol, and tobacco taxes, contrasting results using annual
income and annual expenditure. The main ﬁnding in both studies is that excise taxes appear less
regressive when expenditure is used. Where longitudinal data are available, other studies have
constructed measures of long-run income such as the present discounted value of lifetime earnings.
See, e.g., Haider and Solon (2006) and Rothstein and Wozny (2009).
The RECS data only include a single year of income and no measure of ﬁnancial wealth. How-
ever, the survey does include highly-detailed information about the appliances owned by the house-
hold. In this subsection we use this information to construct a measure of “appliance wealth” that
may be a reasonable proxy for lifetime income. Because households replace appliances relatively
infrequently, our approach is likely to be more accurate than a measure of the total resources of
the household than expenditure on appliances in a given year.
We consider four classes of appliances: refrigerators, clothes washers, dryers and dishwashers.
The RECS also includes detailed information about heating and cooling equipment, but we exclude
these durable goods because they are more a function of climate than household resources. We
also wanted to focus on durable goods that were not primary drivers of natural gas consumption
in the home. Refrigerators are the best example because the size, age, and characteristics of a
refrigerator are correlated with household wealth yet the appliance uses no natural gas. The only
appliance we considered that directly uses natural gas is the clothes dryer. In our sample 30% of
households own a clothes dryer that runs on natural gas. Clothes washers and dishwashers use
natural gas indirectly through consumption of hot water, but this is a relatively small fraction of
total natural gas consumption. One might have, in addition, included cars and trucks owned by
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the household but the RECS focuses on energy consumption within the home and does not include
questions about household vehicles.1
We predict the price at the time of sale for these appliances using Consumer Reports (CR)
magazine from 1986-2005. CR publishes an article on each of these four types of appliances every
year or two. For refrigerators, for example, CR included an article approximately every two years
during the 1980s, and then every year since 2000. These articles include a detailed description of
a representative group of appliance models sold during a given year.
We match appliances to CR prices using the reported age of the appliance and other available
characteristics. For example, because the RECS survey was conducted in 2005, for a three year-
old appliance we use the CR article from 2002. More speciﬁcally, because RECS provides an age
range (e.g. 2-4 years old) rather than an exact age, we use the midpoint of the range. Moreover,
for appliances that are “20 years or older” we use prices from the 1986 edition of CR, the oldest
edition that is available electronically. Finally, in less than 5% of all cases a household reports
that they “don’t know” the appliance age. For these cases, we assign appliances to the median age
category for that appliance type.
For each reviewed model, CR reports purchase price and a number of detailed characteristics.
To predict prices we use the most detailed available characteristics that can be matched across
CR and RECS. For example, for refrigerators both CR and RECS report the size (in cubic feet),
whether or not the refrigerator has side-by-side doors, and whether or not the refrigerator has
through-the-door ice and water. For some of the other appliances the characteristics are more
limited. For example, for clothes washers RECS elicits information about the age of the clothes
washer, and whether or not the clothes washer is top-loading or front-loading, but does not ask
about capacity.
Purchase prices are normalized to reﬂect year 2005 prices. We assume that the value of an
appliance depreciates at a constant real annual rate of 5%. This is approximately consistent with
U.S. Department of Energy (2010c) which uses an average life expectancy of about 20 years for most
residential appliances. We have evaluated the sensitivityof our estimates to alternativedepreciation
rates (2% and 8%) and results are similar.
Table A7 reports results by durable wealth quintile. Results are similar to the results by income
quintile. Changes in natural gas bills range across quintiles from +$57 annually in the ﬁrst quintile
to -$55 annually in the ﬁfth quintile. These fairly modest eﬀects reﬂect the fact that appliance
wealth is no more correlated with natural gas consumption than household income. Whereas the
correlation between natural gas consumption and household income is .19, the correlation between
1The 2009 RECS includes a new section on “Residential Transportation” that elicits information about vehicles
owned by the household by vehicle year, make, and model and it would be interesting to repeat this analysis with
these data when they become available.
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natural gas consumption and appliance wealth is .15. Overall, Table A7 suggests that our results
may not be unduly sensitive to a more long-run measure of household resources.
Still, it is important to point out that there are important limitations to “appliance wealth”
as a measure of permanent income. The measure is likely to work best for homeowners who have
lived in their home for a long time. In these cases, the appliance portfolio essentially provides a
20+ year history of household expenditure on appliances. The measure works less well for new
homeowners and renters because of principal-agent problems and other market failures. Because
secondary markets for appliances are near non-existent, a new homeowner may need to continue
to use whatever appliances are sold with the home rather than immediately adopting an appliance
portfolio consistent with what the household can aﬀord based on permanent income. Similarly,
landlords may underinvest in high-quality appliances when informational asymmetries make it
diﬃcult to credibly convey information about these investments. The landlord-tenant problem
implies that “appliance wealth” is likely to understate permanent income for renters.
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Table A7: The Distributional Impact By Appliance Wealth Quintile
Mean Annual Mean Change
Change in Dollars in Percent
1st Quintile $56.64 (10.10) 7.8% (1.6)
2nd Quintile $28.57 (10.51) 3.5% (1.3)
3rd Quintile -$2.14 (9.31) -0.3% (1.1)
4th Quintile -$31.12 (10.71) -3.5% (1.1)
5th Quintile -$54.84 (10.41) -5.7% (1.0)
Note: This table reports how household expenditure on natural gas would change under marginal cost
pricing. Bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replicationsare shown in parentheses. All calculations
are made using RECS sampling weights. Dollar amounts are expressed in year 2010 dollars.
59